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Abstract
Multivalued treatments are commonplace in applications. We explore the use of
discrete-valued instruments to control for selection bias in this setting. We establish
conditions under which counterfactual averages and treatment effects are identified for
heterogeneous complier groups. These conditions require a combination of assumptions
that restrict both the unobserved heterogeneity in treatment assignment and how the
instruments target the treatments. We introduce the concept of filtered treatment,
which takes into account limitations in the analyst’s information. Finally, we illustrate
the usefulness of our framework by applying it to data from the Student Achievement
and Retention Project and the Head Start Impact Study.
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1
Introduction
Much of the literature on the evaluation of treatment effects has concentrated on the paradig-
matic “binary/binary” example, in which both treatment and instrument only take two val-
ues. Multivalued treatments are common in actual policy implementations, however; and
multivalued instruments are just as frequent. Many different programs aim to help train
job seekers for instance, and each of them has its own eligibility rules. Tax and benefit
regimes distinguish many categories of taxpayers and eligible recipients. The choice of a
college and major has many dimensions too, and responds to a variety of financial help pro-
grams and other incentives. Randomized experiments in economics resort more and more to
factorial designs; they have a long tradition in applied statistics, starting with Fisher in the
1920s1. As the training, education choice, and tax-benefit examples illustrate, multivalued
treatments are often also subject to selection on unobservables. We explore in this paper
the use of discrete-valued instruments in order to control for selection bias when evaluating
discrete-valued treatments. We establish conditions under which counterfactual averages and
treatment effects are identified for various (sometimes composite) complier groups. These
conditions require a combination of assumptions that restrict both the unobserved hetero-
geneity in treatment assignment and the configuration of the instruments themselves.
Existing work on multivalued treatments under selection on observables includes Imbens
(2000), Cattaneo (2010), and Ao, Calonico, and Lee (2019) among others. The literature
that uses discrete-valued instruments to evaluate treatment effects under selection on un-
observables is more sparse. On the theoretical side, Angrist and Imbens (1995) analyzed
two-stage least-squares (TSLS) estimation when the treatment takes a finite number of or-
dered values. Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) showed how treatment effects can
be identified in discrete choice models for the ordered and unordered cases, respectively. More
recently, Heckman and Pinto (2018) focused on unordered treatments and introduced the no-
tion of “unordered monotonicity” under which treatment assignment is formally analogous to
an additively separable discrete choice model. Several recent papers have studied the case of
binary treatments with multiple instruments, as well as binary instruments with multivalued
or continuous treatments. For the former, Mogstad, Torgovitsky, and Walters (2019, 2020)
and Goff (2020) analyzed the identifying power of different monotonicity assumptions. For
the latter, Torgovitsky (2015), D’Haultfoeuille and Fe´vrier (2015), Huang, Khalil, and Yildiz
(2019), Caetano and Escanciano (2020) and Feng (2020) developed identification results for
different models. On the applied side, Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016) used discrete
instruments to obtain TSLS estimates of returns to different fields of study. Kline and Walters
1Muralidharan, Romero, and Wu¨thrich (2019) reviews recent applications of factorial designs.
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(2016) revisited the Head Start Impact Study and accounted for the presence of a substitute
treatment (alternative preschools in this case). Kamat (2019) developed partial identifica-
tion results for a selection model with latent choice sets and analyzed the average effects of
Head Start preschool access.
Our work is substantially different from any of the aforementioned papers. Rather than
focusing on specific cases, we seek a parsimonious framework within which many useful
models with multiple treatments and multiple instruments can be analyzed.
Going from a binary treatment to multivalued treatments with discrete-valued instru-
ments raises (at least) two new questions. When treatment can take multiple values, the
analyst often only observes a partition of treatment choices. She might for instance only know
whether an unemployed individual went through a training program, without knowing ex-
actly which program it was. More generally, the analyst only observes a filtered treatment D;
underlying it is an unfiltered treatment T . Treatment effects are of course harder to identify
in the filtered model. The concept of filtering is linked to our earlier work (Lee and Salanie´,
2018), which allowed for limited violations of unordered monotonicity and used continuous
instruments to identify marginal treatment effects.
Moreover, both filtering and the multiplicity of treatments and instruments may give
rise to a bewildering number of cases. In the binary/binary model, the analyst can usually
take for granted that switching on the binary instrument makes treatment (weakly) more
likely for any observation2. With multiple instrument values and multiple treatments, the
correspondence is less clear. We start by imposing the unordered monotonicity property of
Heckman and Pinto (2018) on the unfiltered treatment model. Under unordered monotonic-
ity, it is natural to speak of an instrument targeting an unfiltered treatment by increasing its
relative “mean utility”. Most of our paper relies on the assumption of strict targeting, which
obtains when each instrument only promotes the treatments it targets.
To illustrate, consider the effect of various programs T on some outcomes Y . Let each
instrument value z stand for a policy regime, under which the access to some programs is
made easier or harder than in a control group. Under unordered monotonicity, this translates
into a profile of relative mean utilities of any treatment t under the policy regimes z P Z.
We say that an instrument value z targets a treatment t when it maximizes its relative mean
utility. Suppose that each policy regime consists of values of subsidies for a subset of the
programs, and that these subsidies enter mean utilities additively. Then a policy regime z
targets a treatment t if it has the highest subsidy for this program among all policy regimes.
Strict targeting requires that all policy regimes z1 that do not target t have the same (lower)
2This is satisfied under the LATE-monotonicity assumption (e.g., Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Vytlacil,
2002).
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subsidy for t. It is easy to translate this property in the other examples cited at the beginning
of the introduction.
With complete treatment data (the unfiltered treatment), combining unordered mono-
tonicity and strict targeting allows us to point-identify the size of some complier groups
and the corresponding treatment effects, and to partially identify others. When the data on
treatments is filtered, unordered monontonicity may not carry over to the filtered treatment
D (an observation already in Lee and Salanie´ (2018)); and strict targeting generally does not.
Nevertheless, they confer enough underlying structure to the mapping from instruments to
filtered treatments that we can still identify various parameters of interest.
We give numerous examples throughout the paper. We also illustrate the usefulness of
our framework by applying it to data from the Student Achievement and Retention (STAR)
Project (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos, 2009) and to Kline and Walters’s (2016) analysis
of the Head Start Impact Study. We find that the large intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of the
STAR for female college students results from the aggregation of two very different treatment
effects; this highlights the value of unbundling the heterogeneous compliers. We also confirm
the importance of taking into consideration alternative preschools when evaluating Head
Start; unlike Kline and Walters (2016), we do not rely on parametric selection models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 defines our framework
and introduces filtered and unfiltered treatments. In Section 2, we study identification in
the unfiltered treatment model. We define the concepts of targeting, one-to-one targeting,
and strict targeting and their implications for the identification of the probabilities and the
treatment effects of various complier groups. Section 3 turns to filtered models. We derive
identification results in several leading classes of applications. Finally, we present estimation
results for the two aforementioned empirical studies in Section 4. The Appendices contain
the proofs of all propositions and lemmata, along with some additional material.
1 Filtered and Unfiltered Treatment
We focus throughout on a treatment that takes discrete values, which we label d P D. For
simplicity, we will call D “ d “treatment d” These values are unordered: e.g. d “ 2, when
available, is not“more treatment”than d “ 1. In most of our examples, there is a well-defined
control group, which is denoted by d “ 0. We assume that discrete-valued instruments Zi P Z
are available. We condition on all other exogenous covariates Xi throughout, and we omit
them from the notation. We will use the standard counterfactual notation: Dipzq and Yipd, zq
denote respectively potential treatments and outcomes.
The validity of the instruments requires the usual exclusion restrictions:
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Assumption 1 (Valid Instruments). (i) Yipd, zq “ Yipdq for all pd, zq in D ˆ Z.
(ii) Yipdq and Dipzq are independent of Zi for all pd, zq in D ˆ Z.
Under Assumption 1, we define Di :“ DipZiq and Yi :“ YipDiq. Throughout the paper,
we assume that we observe pYi, Di, Ziq for each i. In addition, the instruments must be
relevant. In the usual binary instrument/binary treatment case (hereafter “binary/binary”),
this translates into a requirement that the propensity score vary with the instruments. In
our more general setting, we impose:
Assumption 2 (Relevant Instruments). Let Zi denote a column vector whose elements are
1 and the variables 1pZi “ zq for z P Z, and Di denote a column vector whose elements are
1 and the variables 1pDi “ dq for d P D. Then ErZiD
J
i s has full rank.
1.1 Unobserved Monotonicity
We now move beyond these standard assumptions. First, we need an assumption that
restricts the heterogeneity in the counterfactual mappings Di. In the binary/binary model,
this is most often done by imposing LATE-monotonicity.
Assumption 3 (LATE-monotonicity in the binary/binary model). (i) or (ii) must hold:
(i) for each observation i, Dip1q ě Dip0q;
(ii) for each observation i, Dip0q ě Dip1q.
With more than two treatment values and/or more than two instrument values, there
are many ways to restrict the heterogeneity in treatment assignment. Since treatments
are not ordered in any meaningful way, we cannot apply the results in Angrist and Imbens
(1995) for instance. Mogstad, Torgovitsky, and Walters (2019, 2020) state several versions of
monotonicity for a binary treatment model with |Z| ą 2. They propose an assumption PM
(partial monotonicity) which applies binary LATE-monotonicity component by component.
This requires that the instruments be interpretable as vectors, which is not necessarily the
case here.
Heckman and Pinto (2018) took another path; they defined an unordered monotonicity
property that is motivated by an analogy to revealed preference theory. This can be stated
as follows:
Assumption 4 (Unordered Monotonicity at pz, z1q). For any treatment value d P D, (i) or
(ii) must hold:
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(i) if Dipzq “ d, then Dipz
1q “ d;
(ii) if Dipz
1q “ d, then Dipzq “ d.
The easiest way to understand Assumption 4 is to think of treatment assignment as
generated by a discrete choice problem. If observation i “chose” treatment value d under z,
then a change in instrument value that increases the mean utility of treatment d at least as
much as the mean utilities of other treatment values should lead i to still choose d. This
is more than illustrative: Heckman and Pinto (2018) show that the treatment assignment
models that satisfy unordered monotonicity for each pair of instrument values in a set Z can
be represented by a discrete choice problem with additively separable errors, that is
Dipzq “ argmax
dPD
pUzpdq ` uidq
for random vectors puidqdPD that are distributed independently of Zi.
3 Let AS-DCM denote
this class of models. Clearly, Asssumption 4 is more restrictive if the set of instrument values
Z is richer. In Example 1 below, we would only want to invoke Assumption 4 on some policy
changes.
Example 1. Unemployed individuals can be assigned either to a control group or to three
different training programs, with treatment values d “ 1, 2, 3. Consider three alternative
policy changes (z Ñ z1), all of which make more individuals eligible for treatment 1. Policy
change A at the same time restricts the eligibility criteria for both treatments 2 and 3 in
unspecified ways. Policy change B leaves eligibility criteria unchanged for treatments 2 and 3,
and policy change C restricts them for treatment 2 only. Assumption 4 would require that
all observations that have treatment 1 under z must also have treatment 1 under z1, which
seems natural in this context. It would also prevent “two-way moves” between treatment 2
and treatment 3, which seems restrictive. Assumption 4 would be more credible with policy
changes B and C.
1.2 Filtering Treatment Models
Heckman and Pinto (2018) showed how unordered monotonicity could be applied to identify
some treatment effects (or weighted averages of treatment effects). In Lee and Salanie´ (2018),
we considered a more general family of models of treatment assignment. We allowed for
3As a special case, unordered monotonicity includes ordered treatments in whichDipzq “ argmax
dPD
pUzpdq`
σpdquiq for some increasing positive function σ.
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treatment assignment to be determined by any logical combination of a finite set of threshold-
crossing rules of the form uij ď Qjpzq. All AS-DCM models clearly belong to this class, as
Dipzq is characterized by
uid ´ ui,Dipzq ď UzpDipzqq ´ Uzpdq for all d P D.
Our results showed that this class of models can be generated by
1. taking an AS-DCM model of assignment to treatment values T P T ,
2. generating the observed treatment D P D from a partition of the set T .
This defines the class of models of assignment to treatment that we analyze in this paper.
We call such models “filtered treatment”, and we will refer to the (imperfectly observed)
model of treatment in 1 above as the “unfiltered treatment”. To pursue the discrete choice
analogy: in the unfiltered model, each observation chooses a treatment within D and the
analyst observes this choice. In a filtered model, choices are aggregated into groups; the
analyst only observes which group the treatment chosen belongs to. The aggregation occurs
via a filtering map from T to D.
Definition 1 (Filtered Treatment). The treatment assignment model is determined by:
1. a finite set T ;
2. a partition of T which we call D; or equivalently, a surjective filtering map M : T Ñ D;
3. a finite set of instrument values Z; and
4. an AS-DCM model of unfiltered treatment:
Tipzq “ argmax
tPT
pUzptq ` uitq,
where the vector puitqtPT is distributed independently of Zi and has full support on
IR|T |.
Our paper focuses on such models.
Assumption 5 (Filtered Treatment). Treatment is assigned according to Definition 1. We
call the model that generates Ti the underlying unfiltered treatment model.
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We will assume throughout, implicitly, that the set of instrument values Z has been
restricted to a subset where unordered monotonicity is a reasonable assumption. We will
also take some liberties with language by speaking of individuals “choosing” their “preferred”
unfiltered treatments and of “mean utilities” Uzptq. These are only meant to simplify the
exposition and do not imply that the individual actually chooses her treatment.
As an example, consider the following double hurdle model; it has |D| “ 2, and an
underlying unfiltered treatment model with |T | “ 3.
Example 2 (Double Hurdle Treatment). The unfiltered treatment has T “ t0, 1, 2u and
Tipzq “ arg max
t“0,1,2
pUzptq ` uitq ,
where the vector pui0, ui1, ui2q is distributed independently of Zi and has full support on IR
3.
Suppose that the filtered treatment is generated by D “ 1pT “ 0q, which corresponds to
the filtering map Mp0q “ 1,Mp1q “Mp2q “ 0; that is,
(1.1)
$&
%
Dipzq “ 1 iff maxpUzp1q ` ui1, Uzp2q ` ui2q ă Uzp0q ` ui0
Dipzq “ 0 otherwise.
Here our logical combination of threshold rules is simply an“AND”over the two inequalities:
ui0 ´ ui1 ą Uzp1q ´ Uzp0q and ui0 ´ ui2 ą Uzp2q ´ Uzp0q.
Lee and Salanie´ (2018) gave a set of assumptions under which the marginal treatment
effect can be identified in a filtered treatment model, provided that enough continuous instru-
ments are available. In Example 2, we would need two continuous instruments, and some
additional restrictions. The current paper is exploring identification with discrete-valued
instruments. In these settings, the combination of Assumptions 1, 2, and 5 is far from suf-
ficient to identify interesting treatment effects in filtered and unfiltered treatment models
in general. In order to better understand what is needed, we now resort to the notion of
response-groups of observations, whose members share the same mapping from instruments
z to unfiltered treatments t. We first state a general definition4.
Definition 2 (Response-vectors and -groups). Let t˜ be an element of T Z and t˜pzq P T
denote its component for instrument value z P Z.
• Observation i has (elemental) response-vector Rt˜ if and only if for all z P Z, Tipzq “
t˜pzq. The set Ct˜ denotes the set of observations with response-vector Rt˜ and we call it
a response-group.
4This is analogous to the definitions in Heckman and Pinto (2018).
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• We extend the definition in the natural way to incompletely specified mappings, where
t˜ is a correspondence from Z to T . We call the corresponding response-vectors and
response-groups composite.
2 Identifying the Unfiltered Treatment Model
We start by introducing additional assumptions on the underlying unfiltered treatment
model. We will illustrate these assumptions in simple graphs; our leading example is the
“ternary/ternary” case when |T | “ |Z| “ 3.
Example 3 (Ternary/ternary unfiltered model). Assume that Z “ t0, 1, 2u and T “
t0, 1, 2u. In the pui1´ui0, ui2´ui0q plane, the points of coordinates Pz “ pUzp0q´Uzp1q, Uzp0q´
Uzp2qq for z “ 0, 1, 2 are important; for a given z,
• Tipzq “ 0 to the south-west of Pz;
• Tipzq “ 1 to the right of Pz and below the diagonal that goes through it;
• Tipzq “ 2 above Pz and above the diagonal that goes through it.
This is shown in Figure 1 for a given z, where the origin is in Pz.
Figure 1: Unfiltered treatment assignment in the ternary/ternary model for given z
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
Pz
Tipzq “ 0 Tipzq “ 1
Tipzq “ 2
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2.1 Targeted Treatments
“Targeting” will be the common thread in our analysis. Just as in general economic discus-
sions a policy measure may target a particular outcome, we will speak of instruments (in the
econometric sense) targeting the assignment to a particular treatment.
Under unordered monotonicity (Assumption 4), assignment to treatment is governed by
the differences in mean utilities pUzptq ´ Uzpτqq and by the differences in unobservables
uit ´ uiτ . Only the former depend on the instrument. Intuitively, an instrument z targets a
treatment t if it makes the difference pUzptq´Uzpτqq as large as possible for given τ . Instead
of requiring this for any τ , we will choose a reference treatment t0 P T and require that z
maximize pUzptq ´ Uzpt0qq for this particular t0. In many applications, the control group is
a natural choice for a reference treatment. Since the control group is usually denoted t “ 0,
we will extend the notation and denote the reference treatment t0 “ 0.
The following definition makes this more precise.
Definition 3 (Targeted Treatments and Targeting Instruments). Let t “ 0 denote a refer-
ence treatment value. For any z P Z and t P T , we denote
∆zptq ” Uzptq ´ Uzp0q
the relative mean utility of treatment t given instrument z.
Let ∆¯t be the maximum value of ∆zptq over z P Z, and Z¯ptq the set of maximizers z P Z.
If Z¯ptq is not all of Z, then for any z P Z¯ptq we will say that instrument value z targets
treatment value t; and we write t P T¯ pzq. We denote T ˚ the set of targeted treatments and
Z˚ “
Ť
tPT ˚
Z¯ptq the set of targeting instruments.
Definition 3 calls for several remarks. First, by construction ∆zp0q ” 0 and Z¯p0q “ Z.
Therefore t “ 0 is not in T ˚. In many of our examples, T ˚ “ T zt0u; the set T ˚ may exclude
other treatment values, however.
If a treatment value t is not targeted, by definition the function z Ñ ∆zptq is constant
over z P Z, with value ∆¯t. While treatment values in T z T
˚ have mean utilities that do
not respond to changes in the instruments, these mean utilities may and in general will
differ across treatments. The probability that an individual observation takes a treatment
t P T z T ˚ also generally depends on the value of the instrument.
More importantly, the utilities Uzptq and therefore the targeting maps Z¯ and T¯ are not
observable; any assumption on targeting instruments and targeted treatments must be a
priori and will be context-dependent. As we will see, these prior assumptions sometimes
have consequences that can be tested.
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Let us return to the illustration that we used in the introduction. A policy regime z
consists of a set of (possibly zero or negative) subsidies Szptq for treatments t P T . If there
is a no-subsidy regime z “ 0 with S0ptq “ 0 for all t, it seems natural to write the mean
utility as Uzptq “ U0ptq ` Szptq. Then relative mean utilities are ∆zptq “ ∆0ptq ` Szptq and
for any treatment t, the set Z¯ptq consists of the instrument values z that subsidize t most
heavily. As this illustration suggests, the sets Z¯ptq may not be singletons, and they may well
intersect. We will show this on several examples.
2.1.1 Targeting Examples
Example 4 is an instance of factorial design in which each non-zero treatment value is targeted
by two instrument values, and one instrument value targets several treatments.
Example 4 (2ˆ 2 factorial design). Let Z “ t0ˆ 0, 0ˆ 1, 1ˆ 0, 1ˆ 1u, where the two digits
indicate the values of two binary instruments z1 and z2. Suppose that T “ t0, 1, 2u, where
z1 “ 1 is intended to promote treatment 1 and z2 “ 1 is intended to promote treatment 2:
∆1ˆ0p1q “ ∆¯1 ą maxp∆0ˆ0p1q,∆0ˆ1p1qq
∆0ˆ1p2q “ ∆¯2 ą maxp∆0ˆ0p2q,∆1ˆ0p2qq.
Depending on the context, it may be reasonable to assume that ∆1ˆ1p1q “ ∆1ˆ0p1q and
∆1ˆ1p2q “ ∆0ˆ1p2q: turning on the two instruments increases the appeal of t “ 1 (resp.
t “ 2) just as much as if only z1 (resp. z2) had been turned on. This would be quite natural
if z1 “ 1 subsidizes treatment 1 and z2 “ 1 subsidizes treatment 2: then 1 ˆ 1 is the policy
regime that subsidizes both. Then we have Z¯p1q “ t1ˆ 0, 1ˆ 1u and Z¯p2q “ t0ˆ 1, 1ˆ 1u;
instrument z “ 1ˆ 1 targets both t “ 1 and t “ 2, so that T¯ p1ˆ 1q “ t1, 2u.
Example 5 (Two Instruments Target the Same Treatment). Let us now modify Example 4
slightly: the instrument can only take values 0 ˆ 0, 1 ˆ 0, and 1 ˆ 1. Then z “ 1 ˆ 0 and
z “ 1ˆ 1 both target treatment t “ 1: Z¯p1q “ t1ˆ 0, 1ˆ 1u.
Example 6 (An Instrument Targets Two Treatments). In this example, Z “ t0, 1u and
T “ t0, 1, 2u. A fraction of individuals in the sample receives a subsidy z “ 1 that can be
used for both treatments t “ 1 and t “ 2; under z “ 0, no treatment is subsidized. We
would expect that ∆1p1q ą ∆0p1q and ∆1p2q ą ∆0p2q, so that Z¯p1q “ Z¯p2q “ t1u; then we
have T ˚ “ t1, 2u and Z˚ “ t1u.
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2.1.2 One-to-one Targeting
Sometimes we will impose the much stronger Assumption 6, or only one of its two parts.
The first part says that a targeted treatment can only have one targeting instrument; the
second part stipulates that a targeting instrument may target only one treatment. Example 4
violates both parts of Assumption 6. Example 5 violates its first part only, and Example 6
only violates its second part.
Assumption 6 (One-to-one Targeting). (i) For any t P T ˚, the set Z¯ptq is a singleton
tz¯ptqu.
(ii) For any z P Z˚, T¯ pzq is a singleton tt¯pzqu.
Note that if both parts of Assumption 6 hold, we can identify Z˚ and T ˚, and an
instrument z P Z˚ to the treatment it targets.
Definition 4 (Labeling Instruments). Let both parts of Assumption 6 hold. To any t P T ˚
we associate the instrument value z “ z¯ptq that targets t, and we denote it by z “ t. This
allows us to define the partition Z “ pZzT ˚q
Ť
T ˚, which is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: One-to-one Targeting
T ˚
Z z T ˚
Z
t
z
T ˚
T z T ˚
T
t
0
Example 7 (Treatment Subsidies). Let T “ t0u
Ť
T ˚ with T ˚ “ t1, . . . , |T | ´ 1u, and
Z “ T . Each z ą 0 instrument can be interpreted as a subsidy that targets the corresponding
treatment t “ z in the sense that for each t ą 0, Stptq ą Szptq for all z ‰ t. .
Example 8 (Binary Instrument). Let T “ t0u
Ť
T ˚ with T ˚ “ t1, . . . , |T | ´ 1u, and
Z “ t0, 1u. An observation with z “ 1 receives a subsidy for the treatment t “ 1, so that
S1p1q ą 0. Other treatment values are not subsidized: S0ptq “ S1ptq “ 0 for all t ‰ 1. Then
∆1ptq “ ∆0ptq for all t ‰ 1, so that Z
˚ “ t1u.
Example 9 (No Control). Let Z “ T ˚, so that there is one fewer instrument value than
treatment values. The simplest example in this class is the ternary/binary model, with
T “ t0, 1, 2u and Z “ T ˚ “ t1, 2u. There are only two classes of observations: those with
z “ 1 were offered a subsidy for t “ 1, and those with z “ 2 were offered a subsidy for t “ 2.
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2.2 Strict Targeting
Assumption 4, conjoined with Assumption 6, imposes some useful restrictions on response
groups.
Proposition 1 (Unfiltered response groups (1)). Under Assumptions 4 and 6, for any t P
T ˚:
• if Tiptq “ 0, then Tipzq ‰ t for all z P Z;
• as a consequence, all response-groups Ct˜ with t˜ptq “ 0 and t˜pzq “ t for some z ‰ t are
empty.
Example 3 (continued) Return to the ternary/ternary model and assume that the targeted
set of treatments T ˚ “ t1, 2u and that Assumptions 4 and 6 hold. This imposes
∆1p1q ą maxp∆2p1q,∆0p1qq and ∆2p2q ą maxp∆1p2q,∆0p2qq.
A possible interpretation is that policy regime z “ 1 (resp. z “ 2) subsidizes treatment t “ 1
(resp. t “ 2) more that policy regimes z “ 0 and z “ 2 (resp. z “ 1) do.
Since Pz has coordinates p´∆zp1q,´∆zp2qq,
• P1 must lie to the left of P0 and P2,
• P2 must lie below P0 and P1.
This is easily rephrased in terms of the response-vectors of definition 2. First note that in the
ternary/ternary case, there are 33 “ 27 response-vectors, R000 to R222, with corresponding
response-groups C000 to C222. Groups Cddd are “always-takers”
5 of treatment value d. All
other groups are “compliers” of some kind, in that their treatment changes under some
changes in the instrument. We will also pay special attention to some non-elemental groups.
For instance, R0˚2 will denote the group who is assigned treatment 0 under z “ 0 and
treatment 2 under z “ 2, and any treatment under z “ 1. That is,
C0˚2 “ C002
Ť
C012
Ť
C022.
Assumption 4 asserts the emptiness of four composite groups out of the 27 possible: C10˚,
C˚01, C˚20, and C2˚0 by Proposition 1. They correspond to 10 elemental groups.
6
5Observations in group C000 are usually called the “never-takers”. We prefer not to break the symmetry
in our notation. We hope this will not cause confusion.
6Specifically, they are: C100, C101, C102, C001, C201, C020, C120, C220, C200, and C210.
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This still leaves us with 17 elemental groups, and potentially complex assignment pat-
terns. Consider for instance Figure 3. It shows one possible configuration for the ternary/ternary
model; the positions for P0, P1 and P2 are consistent with Assumptions 4 and 6.
Figure 3: Unordered monotonic ternary/ternary models: an example
A2
A0C110C010A0
C202
C002 C012
C112
C212
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
P0
P1
P2
The number of distinct response-groups (ten) and the contorted shape of the C212 and C112
groups in Figure 3 point to the difficulties we face in identifying response-groups without
further assumptions. Moreover, this is only one possible configuration: other cases exist,
which would bring up other response-groups.
Figure 3 also suggests that if we could make sure that P1 is directly to the left of P0, the
shape of C212 would become nicer—and group C202 would be empty. Bringing P2 directly
under P0 would have a similar effect. But these are assumptions on the dependence of the
Uzpdq on instruments. The first one imposes ∆1p2q “ ∆0p2q and the second one imposes
∆2p1q “ ∆0p1q. To put it differently, we are now requiring that instrument z “ t, which
maximizes ∆zptq “ Uzptq ´ Uzp0q, should not shift assignment between the other values of
the treatment. This can be interpreted as policy regime z “ 1 (resp. z “ 2) subsidizing
treatment t “ 1 (resp. z “ 2) only.
The following assumption is a direct extension of the discussion above to our general
discrete model.
Assumption 7 (Strict Targeting). Take any targeted treatment value t P T ˚. Then the
function z P Z Ñ ∆zptq takes the same value for all z R Z¯ptq. We denote this common value
by ∆t, and we will say of the instrument values z P Z¯ptq that they strictly target t.
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Under Assumption 7, turning on instrument z P Z¯ptq promotes treatment t without
affecting the relative mean utilities of other treatment values. This explains our use of the
term“strict targeting”. To return to the analogy with a discrete choice model, an instrument
in Z¯ptq plays the role of a price discount on good t in a model of demand for goods whose
mean utilities only depend on their own prices. In the language of program subsidies, all
z P Z¯ptq subsidize t at the same high rate, and all other instrument values offer the same,
lower subsidy (which could be zero or negative).
Note that while we only state the assumption for t P T ˚, it holds by definition for all
t P T zT ˚. Since Z¯ptq “ Z for these treatment values, ∆t “ ∆¯t is the common value of ∆zptq
over all of Z.
Moreover, Assumption 7 only bites for a given t P T ˚ if ZzZ¯ptq has at least two values.
Since Z¯ptq is never empty, this shows that Assumption 7 automatically holds if |Z| “ 2 (one
binary instrument). Therefore it is satisfied in our Examples 6 and 9. Strict targeting also
holds in our Example 7, and in our factorial design of Example 4 if ∆0ˆ1p1q “ ∆0ˆ0p1q and
∆1ˆ0p2q “ ∆0ˆ0p2q (so that z “ 0 ˆ 1 does not subsidize t “ 1 and z “ 1 ˆ 0 does not
subsidize t “ 2).
Note that one-to-one targeting and strict targeting are logically independent assumptions:
neither one implies the other. As we just saw, the factorial design in Example 4 may exhibit
strict targeting; but it never satisfies one-to-one targeting. The converse may also hold, for
instance if z “ 1 and z “ 2 both subsidize t “ 1, and z “ 2 is a more generous subsidy.
Then we would expect Z¯p1q “ t2u yet ∆0p1q ă ∆1p1q.
Example 10 (Tuition Subsidies). To shed light on Assumption 7, consider two types of
policies aimed at making education more affordable. Our first policy consists of field-specific
tuition subsidies. Each individual i is offered randomly a choice of mi ě 0 vouchers for a
subset Zi of fields. If mi ě 1, the individual may choose to use a voucher to study in a field
in Zi, to study in another field, or not pursue education. Let Ti denote this choice, with
Ti “ 0 for no education. For fixed t ‰ 0, the value of ∆zptq is highest when t P z as a voucher
can be used. Therefore Z¯ptq is the set of menus of vouchers that include field t; and T ˚ is
the set of fields for which a voucher is sometimes, but not always offered. Whether Z¯ptq is
a single menu or not, all other menus of vouchers yield the same ∆zptq: the field t is strictly
targeted7.
Another possible policy consists in subsidizing tuition for every year of study in the hope
of increasing the number of years of education. Now z is a subsidy rate, and t the number
7Note that iff mi ď 1 for each individual, targeting is one-to-one. If not, either part of Assumption 6
could fail. If the fields are French (F), Greek (G), Korean (K), and Latin (L), a set of two menus z1 “ tF,Ku
and z2 “ tG,Lu fails the second part of Assumption 6; a set z1 “ tF,Ku and z2 “ tG,Ku fails both parts.
15
of years of education. Since a higher subsidy rate reduces the cost of education, for any t
the function ∆zptq achieves its maximum ∆¯t for the highest subsidy z¯ on offer: for each t,
Z¯ptq “ tz¯u and Assumption 7 fails. More importantly, if |Z| ą 2 then for any t ą 0, the
value of ∆zptq increases with z ‰ z¯. Strict targeting would clearly not be an appropriate
assumption in this setting.
Extending our geometric illustration of Example 3, let Pz be the point in IR
|T ˚| with
coordinates p´∆zptqqtPT ˚ . Under Assumption 7, the point Pz has its t coordinate equal to
´∆t on any axis t which it targets (t P T¯ pzq), and ´∆t on any other axis. Since ´∆t ą ´∆t,
two points Pz and Pz1 have the same coordinate on any axis t R T¯ pzq
Ť
T¯ pz1q; and Pz is
below Pz1 on axis t if t P T¯ pzqzT¯ pz
1q.
Now suppose that in addition to Z˚, the set of instruments contains at least two values
z0 and z1. Since neither targets any treatment, under Assumption 7 ∆z1ptq “ ∆z0ptq “ 0
for any t P T ˚. Moreover, ∆zptq equals ∆t for all z P Z if t R T
˚. This implies that the
counterfactual treatments Tipz0q and Tipz1q must be equal for any observation i. In that
sense, z1 is superfluous and we can aggregate it with z0 in a category that we will call z “ 0.
By the previous paragraph, if z ‰ 0 then the point P0 is above the point Pz on any axis
t P T¯ pzq.
We summarize this in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Some consequences of strict targeting). Under Assumption 4 and Assumption 7,
(i) The coordinates of two points Pz and Pz1 in IR
|T ˚| coincide on any axis t1 that is not
in the symmetric difference T¯ pzq △ T¯ pz1q.
(ii) If z P Z¯ptq and z1 P Z¯ptq, the point Pz1 is above the point Pz on the axis t.
(iii) The set of instrument values Z is either Z˚, or the union of Z˚ and of a single
instrument value that we denote z0 R Z
˚. In the latter case, for any z ‰ z0 the point
Pz is below the point Pz0 on any axis t P T¯ pzq, and it has the same coordinates on all
other axes. For simplicity, if such a z0 exists we denote z0 “ 0.
Just as we chose to denote our reference treatment as t0 “ 0, our choice of z0 “ 0 is a
convention. It may be most natural when for instance a subpopulation receives no program
subsidy.
Strict targeting imposes a lot of structure on the mapping from instruments to treatments.
To make this clear, we first state a definition.
Definition 5 (Preferred targeted and alternative treatments). Take any observation i in the
population.
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(i) For z P Z˚, let
V ˚i pzq “ max
tPT¯ pzq
p∆¯t ` uitq
and T ˚i pzq Ă T¯ pzq denote the set of maximizers. We call the elements of T
˚
i the
preferred targeted treatments.
(ii) Also define
∆˚i “ max
tPT
p∆t ` uitq
and let τ˚i Ă T denote the set of maximizers. We call the elements of τ
˚
i the preferred
alternative treatments.
Under strict targeting, an observation i can react to being assigned an instrument z in two
ways. If z is in Z˚, then i can choose among the treatments that z targets. Alternatively, it
may choose as if no treatment was targeted (as it must if z is not in Z˚). We now make this
more rigorous by proving that observations can only opt for one of their preferred targeted
treatments, if any, or for one of their preferred alternative treatments.
By Lemma 1, Z is either Z˚ or Z˚
Ť
t0u. We now state our main result on response-
groups.
Proposition 2 (Unfiltered response groups under strict targeting). Let Assumptions 4 and 7
hold. Then for every observation i,
(i) if z P Z˚, then Tipzq can only be in T
˚
i pzq or in τ
˚
i .
(ii) if Z ‰ Z˚, then Tip0q P τ
˚
i .
For simplicity, we work from now on under the assumption that the distribution of the
error terms in the AS-DCM has no mass points. Then the sets τ˚i and T
˚
i pzq are single-
tons with probability 1; with a minor abuse of notation, we let τ˚i and T
˚
i pzq denote their
elements8.
Assumption 8 (Absolutely continuous errors). The distribution of the random vector puitqtPT
is absolutely continuous.
Proposition 3 (Unfiltered classes under strict targeting). Under Assumptions 4, 7, and 8,
the population contains at most two subpopulations denoted by P1 and P2.
(i) Subpopulation P1 can only exist if Z “ Z
˚. If i P P1, then Tipzq “ T
˚
i pzq for all z P Z.
8Note that this does not extend to the sets Z¯ptq and T¯ pzq, which can still have several elements.
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(ii) Subpopulation P2 consists of classes denoted by cpA, τq, where A is a possibly empty
subset of Z˚ and τ is a treatment value. If observation i is in cpA, τq, then the following
holds.
• Tipzq “ T
˚
i pzq for all z P A.
• If A ‰ Z, then τ˚i “ τ ; and for all z P Z zA, Tipzq “ τ .
• If A ‰ Z and τ P T ˚, then Z¯pτq Ă A.
(iii) If Z “ Z˚, then there is no class in P2 with A “ Z
˚.
2.2.1 Strict one-to-one targeting
Proposition 3 has a straightforward corollary under one-to-one targeting (Assumption 6).
Recall that under one-to-one targeting, the sets Z¯ptq and T¯ pzq are singletons and we can
identify each targeting instrument with the treatment it targets. As a consequence, T ˚i pzq “ z
for each z in Z, and if τ P T ˚ then Z¯pτq “ tτu. This simplifies the statement of our
characterization result.
Corollary 1 (Unfiltered classes under strict, one-to-one targeting). Under Assumptions 4,
6, 7, and 8, the population contains at most two subpopulations denoted by P1 and P2.
(i) Subpopulation P1 can only exist if Z “ Z
˚. If i P P1, then Tipzq “ z for all z P Z.
(ii) Subpopulation P2 consists of classes denoted by cpA, τq, where A is a possibly empty
subset of Z˚ and τ is a treatment value. If observation i is in cpA, τq, then the following
holds.
• Tipzq “ z for all z P A.
• If A ‰ Z, then τ˚i “ τ ; and for all z P Z zA, Tipzq “ τ .
• If A ‰ Z and τ P T ˚, then τ P A.
(iii) If Z “ Z˚, then there is no class in P2 with A “ Z
˚.
The subpopulation P1, when it exists, regroups “super-compliers”: they always take the
treatment that is targeted by the instrument value they were assigned. E.g. if Z “ Z˚ “
t1, 2, 3u, under strict one-to-one targeting this subpopulation would be the response group
C123. It is easy to see from the proof that an observation i belongs to P1 if and only if for
all z P Z “ Z˚, V ˚i pzq ą ∆
˚
i .
Given any (possibly empty) subset A of T ˚ and a treatment value τ , an observation i
belongs to cpA, τq if and only if
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• for all z P A, V ˚i pzq ą ∆
˚
i ;
• for all z P Z˚ zA, V ˚i pzq ă ∆
˚
i ;
• ∆˚i “ ∆τ ` uiτ .
First consider the case when A is empty. Whatever the value of the instrument z is, an
observation i in cpH, τq will take up the treatment τ that maximizes uit over T . Such
observations are always-takers of τ . In the polar case A “ Z˚, when it is assigned a targeting
instrument value (z P Z˚), the observation complies by picking one of the treatments it
targets (Tipzq “ T
˚
i pzq, which is z under one-to-one targeting). When both A and Z zA are
non-empty, the observation complies when the instrument z is in A, and it does not respond
to changes in the value of z when it is in Z zA.
Figure 4: An unfiltered class cpA, τq under strict one-to-one targeting
z
A
Z˚ zA
0
Z
0
z
A
T
τ˚i τ
˚
i
T ˚ zA
Figure 4 represents the mapping of instruments to treatments for an observation i in
population P2 under strict one-to-one targeting. We illustrate a case for which Z
˚ “ Z z t0u,
Z˚ z A is not empty, and τ P A. The white area shows that treatment values in T ˚ zA are
not assigned.
2.2.2 Applications
Example 3 (continued) To illustrate Corollary 1, we return to the ternary/ternary model
of Example 3, where Z˚ “ T ˚ “ t1, 2u and Z “ T “ t0, 1, 2u.
• P1 does not exist.
• A can be H, t1u, t2u, or t1, 2u, with corresponding values of τ in t0u, t0, 1u, t0, 2u or
t0, 1, 2u respectively. The class cpH, 0q corresponds to the always-takers of 0, A0 “
C000. For A “ t1u we get C010 and A1, and for A “ t2u we get C002 and A2. Finally,
with A “ t1, 2u we obtain the composite response group C˚12 “ C012
Ť
C112
Ť
C212.
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Figure 5: Unfiltered, strictly one-to-one targeted treatment: ternary/ternary model
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
P0
C012
C010
C002
A0
A1
A2
C112
C212
P1
P2
The eight elemental response groups are illustrated in Figure 5, again with the ori-
gin in P0. Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 3 shows the identifying power of Assump-
tion 7. Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016) used a ternary-ternary model in their in-
vestigation of field of study and earnings. We show in Appendix C.1 that our combination
of Assumption 4 and Assumption 7 yields exactly the same identifying restrictions as in
Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016), by a quite different path.
Figure 6: Unfiltered, strict one-to-one targeting: ternary/binary model with no control
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
P1
P2
C10
C12
A0
A2
A1
C02
Our next example has Z “ Z˚: all individuals are assigned a targeting instrument.
Example 11 (Ternary/binary model with no control). Let us return to Example 9, consider
T “ t0, 1, 2u, and Z “ Z˚ “ t1, 2u: z “ 1 strictly targets t “ 1 and z “ 2 strictly targets
t “ 2.
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Now the subpopulation P1 exists; it corresponds to the response group C12 of super-
compliers. A can be H, with τ “ 0; it can be t1u, with τ P t0, 1u; or it can be t2u, with τ P
t0, 2u. This generates response groups A0; C10 and A1; and C02 and A2. These six elemental
response-groups are represented in Figure 6, where we put the origin at ui0 “ ui1 “ ui2 since
there is no P0 point any more.
Sometimes one can obtain the characterization in Corollary 1 with a weaker assumption
than Assumption 6. To see this, consider the following variant of Example 8.
Example 12 (Only one type of subsidy). Assume that T “ t0, 1, 2u and Z “ t0, 1u. We
interpret z “ 1 as offering a subsidy for t “ 1, and z “ 0 as the absence of subsidy;
treatment t “ 2 is never subsidized. Therefore ∆1p1q ą ∆0p1q and ∆1p2q “ ∆0p2q; we have
Z¯p1q “ t1u, Z¯p2q “ t0, 1u “ Z, and T ˚ “ Z˚ “ t1u. Since we only have a binary instrument,
strict targeting holds in this example.
The subpopulation P1 cannot exist here since z “ 0 is not in Z
˚. In subpopulation P2, we
can have classes A “ H with τ P t0, 2u, and A “ t1u with τ P T . The former generates the
always-takers groups A0 “ C00 and A2 “ C22, and the latter has the two groups of compliers
C01 and C21 and the always-taker group A1 “ C11. These five elemental response-groups are
illustrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Unfiltered, targeted treatment: ternary/binary model with only one type of subsidy
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
P0
C01A0
A2
A1
C21
P1
If we had not imposed ∆0p2q “ ∆1p2q, Assumption 7 would still hold but t “ 2 would
belong to T ˚. If for instance t “ 1 and t “ 2 are both training programs, being offered a
subsidy for t “ 1 may also make the recipient more aware of the value of training in general.
In that case we would have ∆1p2q ą ∆0p2q and Z¯p2q “ t1u, so that T
˚ “ t1, 2u. We would
not have one-to-one targeting anymore since z “ 1 would target both t “ 1 and t “ 2.
21
Therefore, Corollary 1 would not apply. Proposition 3 would apply, however, allowing for a
sixth response group C12, with A “ t1u and τ “ 2.
Still, it seems likely that a subsidy for t “ 1 would increase the appeal of t “ 1 more
than that of t “ 2:
pU1p1q ´ U0p1qq ´ pU1p2q ´ U0p2qq “ p∆1p1q ´∆0p1qq ´ p∆1p2q ´∆0p2qq ą 0.
This is enough to rule out the possibility of the response group C12. To see this, assume that
Tip0q “ 1. This implies U0p1q ` ui1 ą U0p2q ` ui2, so that
U1p1q ` ui1 ą U0p2q ` pU1p1q ´ U0p1qq ` ui2 ą U1p2q ` ui2
and Tip1q cannot be 2.
2.3 Identifying Group Probabilities
Now that we have characterized response-groups, we seek to identify the probabilities of the
corresponding response-groups in the unfiltered treatment model.
Definition 6 (Genralized propensity scores). We write P pt|zq for the generalized propensity
score PrpTi “ t|Zi “ zq.
2.3.1 Strict, one-to-one Targeting
Under Assumptions 6 and 7, the response-groups are easily enumerated.
Proposition 4 (Counting response-groups under strict one-to-one targeting). Under As-
sumptions 4, 6, 7. and 8, the number of response-groups is
N “ p2|T |´ |Z˚|q ˆ 2|Z
˚|´1 ´ p|T |´ 1q1pZ “ Z˚q.
The data gives us the generalized propensity scores P pt|zq “ PrpTi “ t|Zi “ zq for
pt, zq P T ˆ Z. The adding-up constraints
ÿ
tPT
P pt|zq “ 1 for each k P Z reduce the count
of independent data points to |T ˚| ˆ |Z|. As the probabilities of the response-groups must
sum to one, we have pN ´ 1q unknowns.
Table 1 shows some values of the number of equations |T ˚| ˆ |Z| and the number of
unknowns pN ´ 1q for a number of examples. The first row of |T | “ 2 and |Z| “ 2 is the
standard LATE case: the response group consists of never-takers (A0), compliers (C01), and
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Table 1: Number of required identifying restrictions: unfiltered treatment under strict, one-
to-one targeting
Row T Z Z˚ N ´ 1 |Z| |T ˚| Required Example
(1) {0,1} {0,1} {1} 2 2 0 LATE
(2) {0,1,2} {0,1} {1} 4 4 0 Example 12
(3) {0,1,. . . ,|T |´ 1} {0,1} {1} 2p|T |´ 1q 2p|T |´ 1q 0 Example 8
(4) {0,1,2} {1,2} {1,2} 5 4 1 Example 11
(5) {0,1,2} {0,1,2} {1,2} 7 6 1 Example 3
(6) {0,1,2,3} {0,1,2} {1,2} 11 9 2
(7) {0,1,2,3} {1,2} {1,2} 8 6 2
(8) {0,1,2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3} 16 9 7
(9) {0,1,2,3} {0,1,2,3} {1,2,3} 19 12 7
always-takers (A1). Rows (2) and its extension (3) show another case of exact identification.
In other rows, as |T | gets larger, the degree of underidentification tends to increase.
It is not difficult to write down the equations that link observed propensity scores and
group probabilities.
Proposition 5 (Identifying equations for response-groups: unfiltered treatment under strict
one-to-one targeting). For any subset A of Z˚, let A` denote the set A
Ť
pT z T ˚q. Under
Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8, the empirical content of the generalized propensity scores
of the unfiltered treatment model is the following system of equations:
(i) If Z ‰ Z˚:
• for z P Z˚ and t P T :
P pt|zq “
ÿ
AĂZ˚ztzu
1pt P A`qPrpcpA, tqq(2.1)
` 1pt P Z˚, t “ zq
ÿ
AĂZ˚
zPA
ÿ
τPA`
PrpcpA, τqq.
• for z R Z˚ and t P T :
P pt|zq “
ÿ
AĂZ˚
1pt P A`qPrpcpA, tqq.(2.2)
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(ii) If Z “ Z˚, for t P T :
P pt|zq “
ÿ
AĂZztzu
1pt P A`qPrpcpA, tqq(2.3)
` 1pt “ zq
¨
˚˝
PrpP1q `
ÿ
AĂZ,A‰Z
zPA
ÿ
τPA`
PrpcpA, τqq
˛
‹‚.
2.3.2 Applications
Proposition 5 can be applied directly to some of the rows of Table 1. According to the table,
our Example 8 is just identified under strict, one-to-one targeting. Proposition 6 confirms
it and gives explicit formulæ, along with simple testable predictions. To avoid repetitions,
in the remainder of Section 2, we assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 hold with
D “ T .
Proposition 6 (Response-group probabilities in Example 8). The following probabilities are
identified:
PrpA1q “ P p1|0q,
PrpAtq “ P pt|1q for t ‰ 1,
PrpCt1q “ P pt|0q ´ P pt|1q for t ‰ 1.
(2.4)
The model has p|T |´ 1q testable predictions:
P pt|0q ě P pt|1q for t ‰ 1.
Row (5) of Table 1 is the ternary/ternary model of Example 3, in which eight elemental
groups are non-empty. One restriction is missing to point-identify the probabilities of all
eight response-groups. The following proposition shows that the probabilities of four of the
eight elemental groups are point-identified: two groups of always-takers, and two groups of
compliers. In addition, the probabilities of two composite groups of compliers are point-
identified. The other four probabilities are constrained by three adding-up constraints.
Proposition 7 (Response-group probabilities in the ternary/ternary model of Example 3).
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The following probabilities are identified:
PrpA1q “ P p1|2q,
PrpA2q “ P p2|1q,
PrpC112q “ P p1|0q ´ P p1|2q,
PrpC212q “ P p2|0q ´ P p2|1q,
PrpC010
Ť
C012q “ P p0|0q ´ P p0|1q,
PrpC002
Ť
C012q “ P p0|0q ´ P p0|2q,
PrpC002
Ť
C012
Ť
C010
Ť
A0q “ P p0|0q.
(2.5)
The model has the following testable implications:
P p1|0q ě P p1|2q(2.6)
P p2|0q ě P p2|1q(2.7)
P p0|0q ě maxpP p0|1q, P p0|2qq.(2.8)
The model of Example 11 is equally easy to analyze. The probabilities of two groups of
always-takers are point-identified, and two equations link the probabilities of the other three
elemental groups.
Proposition 8 (Response-group probabilities in the ternary/binary model of Example 11).
The following probabilities are identified:
PrpA1q “ P p1|2q,
PrpA2q “ P p2|1q,
PrpC10
Ť
C12q “ P p1|1q ´ P p1|2q,
PrpC02
Ť
A0q “ P p0|1q,
PrpC10
Ť
A0q “ P p0|2q.
(2.9)
The model has the following testable implication:
(2.10) P p1|1q ě P p1|2q.
2.4 Identifying Effects of Unfiltered Treatment
We now establish identification of treatment effects for the complier groups whose probabil-
ities are identified. To simplify the exposition, we introduce one more element of notation.
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Definition 7 (Conditional average group outcomes). For any z P Z, t P T , and for any
response group C with nonzero probability, we define
Ezpt|Cq “ EpYi1pTi “ tq|Zi “ z, i P Cq
and we call it the conditional average group outcome. We define the conditional average
outcome by
E¯zptq “ EpYi1pTi “ tq|Zi “ zq.
To give a trivial example, the LATE formula (row (1) of Table 1) is
EpYip1q|i P C01q “
E¯1p1q ´ E¯0p1q
P p1|1q ´ P p1|0q
and EpYip0q|i P C01q “
E¯0p0q ´ E¯1p0q
P p1|1q ´ P p1|0q
,
yielding the familiar form:
EpYip1q ´ Yip0q|i P C01q “
EpYi|Zi “ 1q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpTi “ 1|Zi “ 1q ´ PrpTi “ 1|Zi “ 0q
.
While the E¯zptq are directly identified from the data, the conditional average group
outcomes of course are not. We do know that some of them are zero; and that they combine
with the group probabilities to form the observed conditional average outcomes. We will use
the following identity repeatedly:
Lemma 2 (Decomposing conditional average outcomes). Let z P Z and t P T . Then
E¯zptq “
ÿ
Cpzq“t
EpYiptq|i P CqPrpi P Cq,
where Cpzq “ t means that response group C has treatment t when assigned instrument z. In
addition,
EpYi|Zi “ zq “
ÿ
tPT
E¯zptq.
First consider Example 8, where the probabilities of all p2|T | ´ 1q response groups are
identified (Proposition 6).
Proposition 9 (Identification in the ternary/binary model under strict one-to-one target-
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ing). The following quantities are point-identified:
E rYip1q|i P A1s “
E¯0p1q
P p1|0q
,
E rYiptq|i P Ats “
E¯1ptq
P pt|1q
for t ‰ 1,
E rYiptq|i P Ct1s “
E¯0ptq ´ E¯1ptq
P pt|0q ´ P pt|1q
for t ‰ 1.
However, the standard Wald estimator only partially identifies the average treatment effects
on the complier groups Ct1:
EpYi|Zi “ 1q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 1q ´ PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 0q
“
pE¯1p1q ´ E¯0p1qq ´
ř
t‰1pE¯0ptq ´ E¯1ptqq
P p1|1q ´ P p1|0q
“
ÿ
t‰1
αtE rYip1q ´ Yiptq|i P Ct1s ,(2.11)
where the weights αt “ Prpi P Ct1|i P
Ť
τ‰1
Cτ1q “ pP pt|0q ´ P pt|1qq{pP p1|1q ´ P p1|0qq are
positive and sum to 1.
Proposition 9 shows that we only identify a convex combination (with point-identified
weights) of the ATEs on the |T ˚| complier groups. It is possible to bound the average treat-
ment effects in a straightforward manner if we assume that the support of Yi is known and
finite. Alternatively, we may add conditions to achieve point identification of average treat-
ment effects for the compliers. Assuming that the ATEs are all equal is one obvious solution.
Another one is to assume the homogeneity of the average outcomes under treatment.
Corollary 2 (Treatment effects in the one-subsidy model). Suppose that the average coun-
terfactual outcomes under treatment 1 are identical for all complier groups:
E rYip1q|i P Ct1s does not depend on t ‰ 1.(2.12)
Then the average treatment effects for all complier groups Ct1 are point-identified:
E rYip1q ´ Yiptq|i P Ct1s
“
E¯1p1q ´ E¯0p1q
P p1|1q ´ P p1|0q
´
E¯0ptq ´ E¯1ptq
P pt|0q ´ P pt|1q
.
To interpret the homogeneity condition in (2.12), suppose that we are concerned with the
effect of one subsidized program (t “ 1) when other, unsubsidized programs (t ą 1) are also
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available. Then (2.12) imposes that outcomes for compliers (who switch to the subsidized
program when offered a subsidy) are on average the same regardless where the compliers
switched from.
We now move on the ternary/ternary model in Example 3. As we mentioned earlier, in
this example our assumptions allow us to use the results of Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad
(2016). Their Proposition 2 tells us that
β1 “ E
“
Yip1q ´ Yip0q
ˇˇ
i P C010
Ť
C012
‰
,
β2 “ E
“
Yip2q ´ Yip0q
ˇˇ
i P C002
Ť
C012
‰
,
where β1 and β2 are the probability limits of the instrumental variable estimators in
Yi “ β0 ` β11pTi “ 1q ` β21pTi “ 2q ` εi.(2.13)
We now show that we can also identify the average treatment effects for the response groups
C112 and C212, whose probabilities are point-identified.
Proposition 10 (Identification of treatment effects for Example 3). The average treatment
effects of C112 and C212 are identified:
E rYip1q ´ Yip2q|i P C212s
“
pE rYi|Zi “ 1s ´ E rYi|Zi “ 0sq ´ β1 pP p0|0q ´ P p0|1qq
P p2|0q ´ P p2|1q
and
E rYip2q ´ Yip1q|i P C112s
“
pE rYi|Zi “ 2s ´ E rYi|Zi “ 0sq ´ β2 pP p0|0q ´ P p0|2qq
P p1|0q ´ P p1|2q
.
The average treatment effect E rYip1q ´ Yip2q|i P C212s brings interesting information of a
different nature than β1 “ E
“
Yip1q ´ Yip0q
ˇˇ
i P C010
Ť
C012
‰
, which Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad
(2016) focus on. We can illustrate this on the choice of college education, using a special
case of Example 10. Let z “ 1 be a tuition subsidy for a college STEM curriculum, and
z “ 2 a tuition subsidy that is available to all college students. The treatments are: not
going to college (t “ 0), studying STEM in college (t “ 1), and opting for a non-STEM
college curriculum (t “ 2); the outcome Y is later earnings.
Both response groups C010, C012, and C212 are all comprised of individuals who will study
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STEM if and only if they receive a STEM subsidy. On the other hand, individuals in
C010
Ť
C012 will not go to college unless they receive a subsidy, while those in C212 are“college
always-takers”. These are quite different populations and there is no reason to expect that
the effect of a STEM major on their future earnings should be the same, even on average.
3 The Filtered Treatment Model
We now turn to filtered versions of the treatment model we analyzed in the previous sec-
tion. That is, we consider a model with a treatment variable Di P D, where the set of
filtered treatment values D is a non-trivial partition of the set of unfiltered treatment val-
ues T “ 0, . . . , |T | ´ 1. By definition, 2 ď |D| ă |T |. We impose unordered monotonicity
(Assumption 4) on the unfiltered treatment model.
Let M : T Ñ D denote the “filtering map”: for any d P D, the set of unfiltered t’s that
generate the observation D “ d is M´1pdq. The statistics that can be identified from the
data are obtained by summing their unfiltered equivalent over t PM´1pdq.
To make this more precise, we add superscripts T or D to response groups, conditional
probabilities and expectations to indicate whether they pertain to the unfiltered treatment
model or to the filtered treatment model. For instance, CT refers to a response group in the
unfiltered treatment model (a “T -response group”). The filtering map transforms CT into
a “D-response group” CD straightforwardly: if CTpzq “ t, then C
D
pzq “ Mptq. Define M¯ to
be the component-by-component extension of M , so that M¯pCT q ” pMpt1q, . . . ,Mpt|Z|qq for
pt1, . . . , t|Z|q P C
T . Then the D-response groups are
CD “
Ť
CT | M¯pCT q“CD
CT ,
with probabilities
Prpi P CDq “
ÿ
CT | M¯pCT q“CD
Prpi P CT q.
We let P T pt|zq denote the generalized propensity scores, and ETz pt|C
T q and E¯Tz ptq the con-
ditional average group outcomes and conditional average outcomes of Definition 7. Their
equivalents in the filtered treatment model are
(3.1) PDpd|zq ” PrpDi “ d|Z “ zq “
ÿ
tPM´1pdq
P T pt|zq
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and for any response group C,
EDz pd|Cq ” EpYi1pDi “ dq|Zi “ z, i P Cq “
ÿ
tPM´1pdq
ETz pt|Cq.
Finally,
(3.2) E¯Dz pdq ” EpYi1pDi “ dq|Zi “ zq “
ÿ
tPM´1pdq
E¯Tz ptq.
Since we do not observe Ti, only the left-hand sides in Equation (3.1) and Equation (3.2) are
identified from the data. Finally, we let Tipzq andDipzq denote the counterfactual treatments,
and Y Ti ptq and Y
D
i pdq the counterfactual outcomes.
3.1 Applications
It would be easy, but perhaps not that useful, to translate the general results of Section 2.3
and Section 2.4 to the filtered treatment model. We choose to focus here on two useful classes
of examples in which the unfiltered treatment model satisfies strict, one-to-one targeting.
3.1.1 Binary filtered treatment
Let us first return to the binary instrument/multiple unfiltered treatment model (Example 8).
Since z “ 1 targets unfiltered treatment t “ 1, it seems natural to start with a binary filtered
treatment: Di “ 1pTi “ 1q. This corresponds to a filtering map M1 defined by
• M1p1q “ 1
• M1ptq “ 0 for t ‰ 1.
In this case, the analyst can observe whether an observation i took the targeted treatment;
if not, then i could be in any other treatment cell.
The mapping of T -response groups to D-response groups is straightforward. The groups
of always takers of treatment t “ d “ 1 coincide: AD
1
“ AT
1
. The other always-takers map
into the single group AD
0
“
Ť
t‰1
ATt ; and the compliers C
T
t1 combine into C
D
01
“
Ť
t‰1
CTt1. Under
M1, we have P
Dp1|zq “ P T p1|zq for z “ 0, 1. That is the sum of our information on group
probabilities. Moving to treatment effects, we observe E¯Dz p1q “ E¯
T
z p1q and
(3.3) E¯Dz p0q “
ÿ
t‰1
E¯Tz ptq
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for z “ 0, 1.
This allows us to identify the probabilities of D-response group and a weighted LATE,
with unknown weights this time.
Proposition 11 (Identification in the filtered binary instrument model (1)). (i) The prob-
abilities of the three D-response groups are point-identified:
PrpAD
1
q “ PrpAT
1
q “ PDp1|0q
PrpAD
0
q “
ÿ
t‰1
PrpATt q “ 1´ P
Dp1|1q
PrpCD
01
q “
ÿ
t‰1
PrpCTt1q “ P
Dp1|1q ´ PDp1|0q.
with the testable implication PDp1|1q ě PDp1|0q.
(ii) The following counterfactual expectations are identified:
EpY Di p0q|i P A
D
0
q “
E¯D
1
p0q
1´ PDp1|1q
,
EpY Di p1q|i P A
D
1
q “
E¯D
0
p1q
PDp1|0q
.
(iii) The standard Wald estimator identifies the following combination of LATEs:
EpYi|Zi “ 1q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 1q ´ PrpDi “ 0|Zi “ 0q
“
pE¯D
1
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p1qq ´ pE¯D
0
p0q ´ E¯D
1
p0qq
PDp1|1q ´ PDp1|0q
“ EpY Di p1q|i P C
D
01
q ´
ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpY
T
i ptq|i P C
T
t1q,(3.4)
where the numbers αTt “ Prpi P C
T
t1|i P C
D
01
q are unidentified positive weights that sum
to one.
The LHS of Equation (3.4) is a particular form of weighted LATE: the substitution of
EpY Di p0q|i P C
D
01
q by the weighted average in its second term reflects the lack of information
of the analyst on the respective sizes of the groups CTt1 within C
D
01
, and on the dispersion of
the average counterfactual outcomes when z “ 0 across these groups. If these outcomes are
homogeneous, then we get a stronger (if somewhat obvious) result.
Corollary 3 (Identification in the filtered binary instrument model (2)). Assume that
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EpY Ti ptq|i P C
T
t1q is the same for all t ‰ 1. Then
EpY Di p0q|i P C
D
01
q “
ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpY
T
i ptq|i P C
T
t1q
and the standard Wald estimator identifies the LATE on D-compliers:
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
01
q “
EpYi|Zi “ 1q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 1q ´ PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 0q
.
3.1.2 Ternary Filtered Treatment
If we interpret t “ 0 as a control group and all other values (including t “ 1) as alternative
treatments, then the analyst may only know whether observation i received some kind of
treatment. The corresponding filtering map would be
• M2p0q “ 0
• M2ptq “ 1 for t ą 0.
Given the structure of the problem, this is very limited information. It becomes more useful
if we combine it with M1. Let M3 be the join of M1 and M2:
• M3p0q “ 0
• M3p1q “ 1
• M3ptq “ 2 for t ą 1.
It allows the analyst to know whether an observation was treated, and if treated, whether
it received the targeted treatment. The D-response groups consist of the always-takers
AD
0
“ AT
0
, AD
1
“ AT
1
, AD
2
“
Ť
tą1
ATt ; and the complier groups C
D
01
“ CT
01
and CD
21
“
Ť
tą1
CTt1.
Proposition 12 (Identification in the filtered binary instrument model (3)). (i) The prob-
abilities of the five D-response groups are point-identified:
Prpi P AD
0
q “ PDp0|1q,
Prpi P AD
1
q “ PDp1|0q,
Prpi P AD
2
q “ PDp2|1q,
Prpi P CD
01
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q,
Prpi P CD
21
q “ PDp2|0q ´ PDp2|1q
with the testable implications PDp0|0q ě PDp0|1q and PDp2|0q ě PDp2|1q.
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(ii) The standard Wald estimator identifies the following combination of LATEs:
EpY Di p1q|i P C
D
01
q ´ αD
0
EpY Ti p0q|i P C
T
01
q ´ p1´ αD
0
q
ÿ
tą1
βTt EpY
T
i ptq|i P C
T
t1q(3.5)
“
EpYi|Zi “ 1q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 1q ´ PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 0q
,
where
• αD
0
“ Prpi P CD
01
|i P CD
01
Ť
CD
21
q is a positive weight, smaller than 1, identified as
pPDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1qq{pPDp1|1q ´ PDp1|0qq;
• the numbers βTt “ Prpi P C
T
t1|i P C
D
21
q are unidentified positive weights that sum
to one.
The extension to more general filters is trivial: any finer partition will identify more αDd
parameters and allow the analyst to gain more information on the sizes of D-complier groups
and to refine the interpretation of the Wald estimator.
Let us now turn to the ternary/ternary unfiltered treatment model of Example 3. Re-
member that z “ 1 subsidizes t “ 1 and z “ 2 subsidizes t “ 2. Suppose now that the
analyst only observes whether an individual took one of the subsidized treatments (d “ 1
iff t ą 0) or not (d “ t “ 0). Then M´1p0q “ 0 and M´1p1q “ t1, 2u. The ternary/ternary
unfiltered treatment model becomes a ternary/binary filtered treatment model. The eight
T -response groups of Proposition 7 combine into five D-response groups:
AD
0
“ AT
0
,
AD
1
“ AT
1
Ť
AT
2
Ť
CT
112
Ť
CT
212
,
CD
001
“ CT
002
,
CD
010
“ CT
010
,
CD
011
“ CT
012
.
We observe the conditional probabilities PDp1|zq and the average outcomes E¯Dz p0q and E¯
D
z p1q
for z “ 0, 1, 2.
Proposition 13 (Identification in the ternary/binary filtered model (1)). (i) The proba-
bility of the always-taker group AD
1
is point-identified as PDp1|0q. The other four
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D-response groups probabilities are connected by three equations:
PrpCD
01˚q “ PrpC
D
010
q ` PrpCD
011
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q,
PrpCD
0˚1q “ PrpC
D
001
q ` PrpCD
011
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2q,
PrpCD
00˚q “ PrpC
D
001
q ` PrpAD
0
q “ PDp0|1q.
with the testable implications PDp0|0q ě PDp0|1q and PDp0|0q ě PDp0|2q.
The four partially-identified probabilities can be parameterized as
PrpCD
011
q “ p,
PrpCD
010
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q ´ p,
PrpCD
001
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2q ´ p,
PrpAD
0
q “ PDp0|2q ` PDp0|1q ´ PDp0|0q ` p,
where
maxp0, PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q ´ PDp0|2qq ď p ď PDp0|0q ´maxpPDp0|1q, PDp0|2qq.
(ii) The following average conditional counterfactual outcomes are point-identified:
EpY Di p0q|i P C
D
00˚q “
E¯D
1
p0q
PDp0|1q
,
EpY Di p0q|i P C
D
01˚q “
E¯D
0
p0q ´ E¯D
1
p0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
,
EpY Di p1q|i P C
D
01˚q “
E¯D
1
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p1q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
,
EpY Di p1q|i P A
D
1
q “
E¯D
1
p0q
PDp1|0q
.
(iii) The standard Wald estimators identify the LATE on CD
01˚ and on C
D
0˚1:
EpY Di p1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
01˚q “
EpYi|Zi “ 1q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 1q ´ PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 0q
,(3.6)
EpY Di p1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
0˚1q “
EpYi|Zi “ 2q ´ EpYi|Zi “ 0q
PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 2q ´ PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 0q
.(3.7)
Note that the width of the interval on the unknown p cannot be larger than minpPDp0|1q, PDp0|2qq:
if either instrument z “ 1, 2 is very effective at getting people to adopt public transporta-
34
tion, the sizes of all D-response groups will be almost point-identified. Since the average
counterfactual outcomes on elemental D-response groups are connected by equations like
EpYipdq|i P C
D
01˚q “ qEpYipdq|i P C
D
011
q ` p1´ qqEpYipdq|i P C
D
010
q
with q “ p{pPDp0|0q´PDp0|1qq, one could go further and impose homogeneity assumptions
to improve the identification of elemental LATEs.
3.2 Filtered Factorial Design
We now return to Example 4, which featured a factorial experimental design. Recall that
we had z “ 0 ˆ 0, 0 ˆ 1, 1 ˆ 0, 1 ˆ 1, and T “ t0, 1, 2u. Each instrument combines two
binary instruments: the first one is meant to promote treatment t “ 1 and the second one
promotes t “ 2. We focus here on the case when there is no complentarity (positive or
negative) between the two binary instruments9: ∆T
1ˆ1p1q “ ∆
T
1ˆ0p1q and ∆
T
1ˆ1p2q “ ∆
T
0ˆ1p2q.
This would hold for instance if each binary instrument is a price subsidy and prices enter
mean utilities additively—a common asssumption in discrete choice models. As we saw
in Section 2.1, we have Z¯p1q “ t1 ˆ 0, 1 ˆ 1u and Z¯p2q “ t0 ˆ 1, 1 ˆ 1u, so that this
treatment model does not statisfy one-to-one targeting. On the other hand, we also saw
that strict targeting holds if each binary instrument only has an effect on the treatment
value that it targets. We will impose the corresponding assumptions ∆T
0ˆ1p1q “ ∆
T
0ˆ0p1q and
∆T
1ˆ0p2q “ ∆
T
0ˆ0p2q.
3.2.1 Identification
Let us now introduce a filter, so that the analyst only observes Di “ 1pTi ą 0q.
10 This
yields a ternary/binary filtered treatment model, much as in the previous subsection. There
are two important differences—the instrument takes four values rather than three, and we
imposed several constraints on the mean utilities:
∆T
1ˆ1p1q “ ∆
T
1ˆ0p1q
∆T
1ˆ1p2q “ ∆
T
0ˆ1p2q
∆T
0ˆ1p1q “ ∆
T
0ˆ0p1q
∆T
1ˆ0p2q “ ∆
T
0ˆ0p2q.
(3.8)
9We use a superscript T to remind the reader that the argument in parentheses is an unfiltered treatment
value in T .
10Appendix C.2 provides a variant of filtered factorial design.
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In spite of the filtering, they will allow us to point-identify the relevant LATEs. To see
this, first note that for any given observation i,
Dipzq “ 0 iff ui0 ą maxp∆
T
z p1q ` ui1,∆
T
z p2q ` ui2q,(3.9)
so that the filtered treatment model has the structure of a double hurdle model (Example 2).
Figure 8: Filtered Factorial Design
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
CD
0111
CD
0101
CD
0011
AD
0
AD
1
P0ˆ0
P1ˆ0
P0ˆ1P1ˆ1
First note that under our assumptions, the right hand side is largest when z “ 1 ˆ 1.
Therefore if Dip1ˆ1q “ 0, observation i always takes d “ 0. If on the other hand Dip0ˆ0q “
1, then i is in AD
1
since the right-hand side can only be larger for the other instrument values.
Denote indices in response-groups in the order 0ˆ0, 1ˆ0, 0ˆ1, 1ˆ1. The preceding arguments
leave only the D-response groups CD
0˚˚1. The group C
D
0001
cannot exist since in the absence
of complementarity between the binary instruments,
maxp∆T
1ˆ1p1q ` ui1,∆
T
1ˆ1p2q ` ui2q “ maxp∆
T
1ˆ0p1q ` ui1,∆
T
0ˆ1p2q ` ui2q.
The three other groups are11:
• the eager compliers CD
0111
: any instrument except 0ˆ 0 causes them to adopt d “ 1
• the reluctant compliers CD
0011
and CD
0101
: they only adopt d “ 1 if the right binary
instrument is switched on.
The resulting five D-response groups are shown in Figure 8. Table 2 shows which groups
take Di “ d when Zi “ z.
11We borrow here the terminology of Mogstad, Torgovitsky, and Walters (2019), which they apply to a
rather different model.
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Table 2: D-response Groups
Dipzq “ 0 Dipzq “ 1
z “ 0 CD
0˚˚ “ A
D
0
Ť
CD
001
Ť
CD
010
Ť
CD
011
AD
1
z “ 1 CD
00˚ “ A
D
0
Ť
CD
001
CD˚1˚ “ A
D
1
Ť
CD
010
Ť
CD
011
z “ 2 CD
0˚0 “ A
D
0
Ť
CD
010
CD˚˚1 “ A
D
1
Ť
CD
001
Ť
CD
011
Proposition 14 (Identifying the Filtered Factorial Design Model). (i) the probabilities of
the D-response groups are point-identified by
PrpAD
0
q “ PDp1|0ˆ 0q
PrpAD
1
q “ PDp0|1ˆ 1q
PrpCD
0011
q “ PDp0|1ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|1ˆ 1q
PrpCD
0101
q “ PDp0|0ˆ 1q ´ PDp0|1ˆ 1q
PrpCD
0111
q “ PDp0|0ˆ 0q ` PDp0|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp0|1ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|0ˆ 1q,
and the model has three testable implications:
PDp0|1ˆ 0q ě PDp0|1ˆ 1q,
PDp0|0ˆ 1q ě PDp0|1ˆ 1q,
PDp0|0ˆ 0q ` PDp0|1ˆ 1q ě PDp0|1ˆ 0q ` PDp0|0ˆ 1q.
(ii) The LATEs on the three groups of compliers are point-identified by
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0101
q “
EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 1q
PDp1|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|0ˆ 1q
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0011
q “
EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 0q
PDp1|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|1ˆ 0q
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0111
q “
EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 0q ` EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 0q
PDp1|1ˆ 0q ` PDp1|1ˆ 0q ´ PDp1|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|0ˆ 0q
.
Proposition 14 states that (i) the average treatment effects for reluctant compliers are
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identified by suitable Wald statistics and that (ii) the average treatment effect for eager com-
pliers is identified by a ratio between difference-in-differences (DiD) population quantities.
The latter estimand can be viewed as a two-dimensional version of Wald statistics.
3.2.2 Estimation of EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0111
q with covariates
Most estimands in the paper are expressed in terms of simple Wald estimators, which can be
easily estimated with covariates (e.g. Fro¨lich, 2007). Two exceptional cases are EpY Di p1q ´
Y Di p0q|i P C
D
0111
q in Proposition 14 and EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0001
q in Proposition 15 in
Appendix C.2.
We here discuss how to estimate EpY Di p1q´Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0111
q with covariates. Estimation
of EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0001
q is similar. Introduce covariates Xi explicitly and define:
ErYip1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
0111
, Xi “ xs “
DiDY pxq
DiDDpxq
,
where
DiDY pxq :“ ErYi|Zi “ 1ˆ 0, Xi “ xs ` ErYi|Zi “ 0ˆ 1, Xi “ xs
´ ErYi|Zi “ 1ˆ 1, Xi “ xs ´ ErYi|Zi “ 0ˆ 0, Xi “ xs,
DiDDpxq :“ PrrTi “ 1|Zi “ 1ˆ 0, Xi “ xs ` PrrTi “ 1|Zi “ 0ˆ 1, Xi “ xs
´ PrrTi “ 1|Zi “ 1ˆ 1, Xi “ xs ´ PrrTi “ 1|Zi “ 0ˆ 0, Xi “ xs.
Then,
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0111
q “ E
„
DiDY pXq
DiDDpXq
ˇˇˇ
ˇi P CD0111

.
Lemma 3. Assume that DiDDpXq ‰ 0 almost surely. Then,
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0111
q “
ErDiDY pXqs
ErDiDDpXqs
.
Lemma 3 suggests the following two-step estimation strategy: first, estimate ErYi|Zi “
k,Xi “ xs and PrrTi “ 1|Zi “ k,Xi “ xs for each k P t0 ˆ 0, 1 ˆ 0, 1 ˆ 0, 1 ˆ 1u and
x P tX1, . . . , Xnu; second, evaluate DiDY pXiq and DiDDpXiq, construct their averages and
take the ratio.
For example, the first step can be implemented using sieve estimators. In view of
Ackerberg, Chen, and Hahn (2012); Ackerberg, Chen, Hahn, and Liao (2014), the resulting
two-step sieve estimator is semiparametrically efficient, and furthermore, conventional nor-
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mal inference, pretending that we have a two-step parametric model, is valid for semipara-
metric inference. For brevity of the paper, we omit details.
4 Empirical Examples
4.1 The Student Achievement and Retention Project
In this section, we revisit Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009), who analyzed the Student
Achievement and Retention Project. STAR was a randomized evaluation of academic services
and incentives for college freshmen at a Canadian university. It was a factorial design, with
two binary instruments. The Student Fellowship Program (SFP) offered students the chance
to win merit scholarships for good grades in the first year; the Student Support Program
(SSP) offered students access to both a peer-advising service and a supplemental instruction
service. Entering first-year undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of four groups: a
control group (z “ 0 ˆ 0), SFP only (z “ 0ˆ 1), SSP only (z “ 1ˆ 0), and an intervention
offering both (SFSP, z “ 1ˆ 1).
The data indicates whether a student who was offered a program signed up, and whether
those who were offered SSP or SFSP and signed up made use of the services of SSP.
Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) used the sign-up as the treatment variable. They
comment that “in the SSP and SFSP, a further distinction can be made between compliance
via sign up and compliance via service use” (p. 147). Many students who sign up did not
in fact use the services; this suggests defining an unfiltered treatment variable as a pair
Ti “ pAi, Siq, where Ai “ 1 (for “accept”) denotes that student i signed up and Si “ 1 (for
“services”) that (s)he used the services provided by SSP.
Obviously, Si “ 0 if Ai “ 0. Hence Ti can only take three values: p0, 0q, p1, 0q, and p1, 1q.
With a slight change in notation, we model the choice as
Tipzq “ argmax
`
uip0, 0q,∆
T
z p1, 0q ` uip1, 0q,∆
T
z p1, 1q ` uip1, 1q
˘
.
While there are four instrument values and three treatment values, this is in fact a ternary/ternary
model, with some specific features. First note that Ti “ 0 for all observations in the control
group; this allows us to set ∆T
0ˆ0p1, 0q and ∆
T
0ˆ0p1, 1q at minus infinity. In addition, Si can
only be zero if z “ 0 ˆ 1, so that we can set ∆T
0ˆ1p1, 0q and ∆
T
0ˆ1p1, 1q at minus infinity
too. As a consequence, we do not lose any information by redefining the control group to be
0 ” t0ˆ 0, 0ˆ 1u.
In addition, students should be more likely to sign up under z “ 1 ˆ 1 than under
z “ 1 ˆ 0, as the former adds the lure of a fellowship. We will also assume that it makes
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them more likely to use the services—an assumption that we will test below. Then both
treatment values p1, 0q and p1, 1q are targeted by 1ˆ 1, but they cannot be strictly targeted.
Take for instance Z¯p1, 1q “ t1 ˆ 1u; strict targeting would require ∆T
1ˆ0p1, 1q “ ∆
T
0
p1, 1q,
which is minus infinity.
Rather than to pursue with the unfiltered treatment model, let us move on to filtered
models. In our terminology, Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) chose to use a particu-
lar filter MpA, Sq “ A, which is close to intent-to-treat as they point out. Here we take
MpA, Sq “ S instead: we define
(4.1) Dipzq “ Sipzq “ 1
`
∆Tz p1, 1q ` uip1, 1q ą maxpuip0, 0q,∆
T
z p1, 0q ` uip1, 0qq
˘
.
Since the SFP incentives applied to the first year grades only, we take the grades in the
second year as our outcome variable Yi.
Equation (4.1) has a similar structure to the double hurdle model of Equation (3.9). The
models are quite different, however. This new filtered model has Dip0q “ 0 with probability
one; and we are assuming that an offer of a fellowship makes students more likely to use the
services. Of the a priori four possible response-groups CD
0,d,d1 for d, d
1 “ 0, 1, this assumption
eliminates one: if Dip1 ˆ 1q “ 0 then a fortiori Dip1 ˆ 0q “ 0. This leaves three groups:
the never-takers AD
0
, and two groups of compliers CD
001
and CD
011
. The group CD
001
consists
of reluctant compliers, who only use SSP if it is offered along with SFP. Those in CD
011
are
eager compliers: they use SSP whenever it is offered to them with or without a fellowship.
Remember that PDp1|zq :“ PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ zq for z “ 0, 1ˆ 0, 1ˆ 1. Then P
Dp1|0q “ 0
and the proportions of the three response-groups are given by
PrpAD
0
q “ 1´ PDp1|1ˆ 1q
PrpCD
001
q “ PDp1|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|1ˆ 0q
PrpCD
011
q “ PDp1|1ˆ 0q.
Note that given Equation (4.1),
PDp1|1ˆ 0q “ Pr
`
uip1, 1q ´ uip0, 0q ą ´∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 1q
and uip1, 1q ´ uip1, 0q ą ∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 0q ´∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 1q
˘
PDp1|1ˆ 1q “ Pr
`
uip1, 1q ´ uip0, 0q ą ´∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 1q
and uip1, 1q ´ uip1, 0q ą ∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 0q ´∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 1q
˘
.
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Our assumption that students are more likely to use the services under SFSP translates into
∆T
1ˆ1p1, 1q ą ∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 1q and ∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 0q ´∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 1q ă ∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 0q ´∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 1q.
Figure 9 illustrates a configuration in which these inequalities hold, where
P1ˆ0 “ p´∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 1q,∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 0q ´∆
T
1ˆ0p1, 1qq and P1ˆ1 “ p´∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 1q,∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 0q ´∆
T
1ˆ1p1, 1qq.
Figure 9: STAR example
uip1, 1q ´ uip0, 0q
uip1, 1q ´ uip1, 0q
P1ˆ0
P1ˆ1
AD
0
C001
C011
Under our assumptions, it is straightforward to show that
ErY Di |Zi “ 1ˆ 0s ´ ErY
D
i |Zi “ 0s “ ErY
D
i p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
011
sPrpi P CD
011
q,
ErY Di |Zi “ 1ˆ 1s ´ ErY
D
i |Zi “ 1ˆ 0s “ ErY
D
i p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
001
sPrpi P CD
001
q.
Therefore, we have
ErY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
011
s “
ErY Di |Zi “ 1ˆ 0s ´ ErY
D
i |Zi “ 0s
PDp1|1ˆ 0q
,
ErY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
001
s “
ErYi|Zi “ 1ˆ 1s ´ ErY
D
i |Zi “ 1ˆ 0s
PDp1|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|1ˆ 0q
.
Since PrpDi “ 1|Zi “ 0q “ 0, the first estimand is the IV formula of Bloom (1984); the
second estimand is the LATE formula of Imbens and Angrist (1994).
Table 3 reports estimation results. We only focus on the subsample of women since the
STAR program had no effect on men. Panel A of Table 3 shows the estimated proportions
41
Table 3: Empirical Results from STAR
Panel A. Proportion of Compliers
Prpi P CD
011
q 0.288
(0.040)
Prpi P CD
001
q 0.245
(0.069)
Panel B. GPA On probation Good Credits
or withdrawal standing earned
ErYi|Zi “ 1ˆ 0s ´ ErYi|Zi “ 0s 0.084 0.045 -0.039 -0.065
(0.088) (0.043) (0.046) (0.147)
ErYip1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
011
s 0.291 0.156 -0.137 -0.225
(0.303) (0.152) (0.161) (0.516)
ErYi|Zi “ 1ˆ 1s ´ ErYi|Zi “ 1ˆ 0s 0.186 -0.141 0.163 0.350
(0.127) (0.058) (0.065) (0.208)
ErYip1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
001
s 0.758 -0.576 0.664 1.427
(0.532) (0.265) (0.305) (0.887)
Notes. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The estimation sample con-
sists of women in the control, SSP and SFSP groups. The sample size is
n “ 837. The outcome variables are second year GPA, an indicator of proba-
tion or withdrawal in the second year, a “good standing” variable that in-
dicates whether students attempted at least four credits and were not on
probation, and the credits earned. Estimates of treatment effects are com-
puted based on linear regression models using the full set of controls used in
Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009).
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of the two complier groups: 0.288 for CD
011
and 0.245 for CD
001
. The majority group is the
never-takers whose share is 0.467. This is because the usage of SSP was low. Panel B
reveals remarkable heterogeneity between the two complier groups. We do not find any
significant treatment effect for CD
011
, whereas we do find sizeable and significant impact
on probation/withdrawal and good standing for CD
001
.12 As can be seen in Figure 9, CD
001
is
closer to the group of never-takers: they have higher unobserved disutilities of using academic
support services than those in CD
011
. However, those in CD
001
reaped greater benefits of using
the SSP by avoiding probation or withdrawal in the second year.
The main parameter of interest in Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) was the intent-
to-treat (ITT) effect of the SFSP program: ErYi|Zi “ 1 ˆ 1s ´ ErYi|Zi “ 0 ˆ 0s in our
notation. Our analysis suggests that the ITT effect of the SFSP program is a mix of two
very different treatment effects. This highlights the importance of unbundling heterogeneous
complier groups.
4.2 Head Start
Let us now reexamine Kline and Walters’s (2016) analysis of the Head Start Impact Study
(HSIS) using our framework. The structure of HSIS is identical to that of Example 12.
The treatments consist of no preschool (n), Head Start (h), and other preschool centers (c):
T “ tn, h, cu. We will take t0 “ n as our reference treatment. The instrument is binary,
with a control group (z “ 0) and a group that is offered admission to Head Start (z “ 1).
This gives five response groups: An “ Cnn, Ac “ Ccc, Ah “ Chh, Cnh, and Cch. The first
three groups are always-takers and the last two groups are compliers.
4.2.1 Group proportions and counterfactual means
Their proportions in the sample are given by (2.4) in Proposition 6; they are shown in
Panel A of Table 4. As expected, they coincide with those in Kline and Walters (2016).
Panel B of Table 4 shows the counterfactual means of test scores as per Proposition 9.
Among those that are point-identified, the average test scores are the highest for the groups
who always choose other preschool centers (about 0.3 standard deviation). There is a
noticeable difference between the two complier groups: ErYipnq|i P Cnhs is negative, but
ErYipcq|i P Cchs is above 0.1 standard deviation. This indicates that among compliers, the
children who used other centers had higher scores than those who stayed at home. Head Start
12The point estimates for probation/withdrawal and good standing are very large in absolute value; how-
ever, the standard errors are large as well, resulting in wide confidence intervals. This is partially because
the sample size is relatively small and partially because the estimand is the ratio of two population quantities
with the small denominator.
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may therefore attract some children who already were at a good preschool. Kline and Walters
(2016) call this pattern the “substitution effect” of Head Start. However, the way we achieve
the identification of ErYipnq|i P Cnhs and ErYipcq|i P Cchs is new.
Table 4: Proportions, Counterfactual Means and Treatment Effects by Response Groups
3-year-olds 4-year-olds Pooled
Panel A. Proportions of Response Groups via Proposition 6
Always – no preschool (An) 0.092 0.099 0.095
Always – Head Start (Ah) 0.147 0.122 0.136
Always – other centers (Ac) 0.058 0.114 0.083
Compliers from n to h (Cnh) 0.505 0.393 0.454
Compliers from c to h (Cch) 0.198 0.272 0.232
Panel B. Counterfactual Means of Test Scores via Proposition 9
ErYipnq| P Ans -0.050 -0.017 -0.035
ErYiphq| P Ahs 0.007 -0.080 -0.028
ErYipcq| P Acs 0.293 0.330 0.316
ErYipnq|i P Cnhs -0.027 -0.116 -0.062
ErYipcq|i P Cchs 0.112 0.144 0.129
Panel C. Counterfactual Means of Test Scores via Corollary 2
ErYiphq|i P Cnhs “ ErYiphq|i P Cchs 0.252 0.169 0.216
Panel D. Treatment Effects via Corollary 2
ErYiphq ´ Yipnq|i P Cnhs for compliers from ‘n’ to ‘h’ 0.279 0.285 0.278
(0.063) (0.076) (0.050)
ErYiphq ´ Yipcq|i P Cchs for compliers from ‘c’ to ‘h’ 0.140 0.025 0.087
(0.089) (0.097) (0.063)
ErYiphq ´ Yipnq|i P Cnhs ´ ErYiphq ´ Yipcq|i P Cchs 0.139 0.260 0.191
(0.098) (0.115) (0.071)
Notes: Head Start (h), other centers (c), no preschool (n). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the Head Start center level.
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4.2.2 Treatment Effects
To fully measure the substitution effect, one needs to identify E rYiphq|i P Cnhs and E rYiphq|i P Cchs.
However, under Proposition 9, they are only partially identified by
E rYiphq|i P Cnhs tPrpTi “ n|Zi “ 0q ´ PrpTi “ n|Zi “ 1qu
` E rYiphq|i P Cchs tPrpTi “ c|Zi “ 0q ´ PrpTi “ c|Zi “ 1qu
“ E rYi1pTi “ hq|Zi “ 1s ´ E rYi1pTh “ 1q|Zi “ 0s .
This is exactly the formula on Kline and Walters (2016, pp.1811), where they point out that
the LATE for Head Start is a weighted average of “subLATEs” with weights Sc and p1´ Scq
with
Sc :“
PrpCchq
PrpCnhq ` PrpCchq
“
PrpTi “ c|Zi “ 0q ´ PrpTi “ c|Zi “ 1q
PrpTi ‰ h|Zi “ 0q ´ PrpTi ‰ h|Zi “ 1q
.
Kline and Walters (2016) first tried to estimate ErYiphq´Yipcq|i P Cchs and ErYiphq´Yipnq|i P
Cnhs separately using two-stage least squares (2SLS), using interaction of the instrument
with covariates or experimental sites in an attempt to generate enough variation. They
acknowledged the limitations of this interacted 2SLS approach and developed a parametric
selection model a` la Heckman (1979). Using a parametric selection model and pooled co-
horts, Kline and Walters (2016, Table VIII, column (4) full model) obtain estimates of the
treatment effect of 0.370 p0.088q for Cnh and ´0.093 p0.154q for Cch respectively (standard
errors in parentheses).
Our Corollary 2 provides an alternative approach to separating the two treatment effects.
If we assume that E rYiphq|i P Cnhs “ E rYiphq|i P Cchs, we can point-identify the average
treatment effects for both groups of compliers. The resulting estimates are shown in Panels
C and D of Table 4. The average impact on test scores of participating in Head Start
is around 0.28 for Cnh, whereas it is smaller and insignificant for Cch. Their difference is
significantly different when the two cohorts are pooled together.
We obtained these estimates of the treatment effects by a completely different route than
Kline and Walters (2016). While the two sets of estimates are similar, our estimate of the
difference between the treatment effects on the two groups of compliers is twice smaller. Our
homogeneity assumption E rYiphq|i P Cnhs “ E rYiphq|i P Cchs may be too strong. It might
be more plausible to assume that
E rYiphq|i P Cnhs ď E rYiphq|i P Cchs
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as children who would not attend preschool in the absence of offer to Head Start are likely to
be less well-prepared than children who would attend other preschools. Then our estimated
difference between the two complier groups will be a lower bound of the true difference.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that our targeting and filtering concepts are a useful way to analyze models
with multivalued treatments and multivalued instruments. While our characterization is
sharpest under strict, one-to-one targeting (Corollary 1), our framework remains useful even
without strict targeting. In addition to the examples we discussed in the text and to the
two applications we revisited, we give an example in Appendix C.2, with a ternary/ternary
model where the analyst only observed the least-preferred treatment in a factorial design.
Our paper only analyzed discrete-valued instruments and treatments. Some of the notions
we used would extend naturally to continuous instruments and treatments: the definitions
of targeting, one-to-one targeting, and filtering would translate directly. Strict targeting,
on the other hand, is less appealing in a context in which continuous values may denote
intensities. Our earlier paper (Lee and Salanie´, 2018) can be seen as analyzing continuous-
instruments/discrete-treatments filtered models; so does Mountjoy’s (2019)’s study of 2-year
colleges. Extending our analysis to models with continuous treatments is an interesting topic
for further research.
Appendices
A Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Tiptq “ 0 for some t P T
˚. Then ui0 ą ∆¯t ` uit. However,
∆¯t ą ∆zptq if z R Z¯ptq. Therefore ui0 ą ∆zptq ` uit, and Tipzq cannot be t.
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma is proved in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2. Take any observation i and an instrument value z P Z. The treat-
ment Tipzq must maximize pUzptq ` uitq over t P T . Under Assumption 7, for any t we
have
• Uzptq “ Uzp0q ` ∆¯t if t P T¯ pzq
• Uzptq “ Uzp0q `∆t otherwise.
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Therefore, eliminating Uzp0q,
(A.1) Tipzq P argmax
ˆ
max
tRT¯ pzq
p∆t ` uitq, max
tPT¯ pzq
p∆¯t ` uitq
˙
.
Since ∆¯t ě ∆t for all t P T , a fortiori ∆¯t ` uit ě ∆t ` uit when t P T¯ pzq. As a consequence,
we can rewrite Equation (A.1) as
Tipzq P argmax p∆
˚
i , V
˚
i pzqq .
(i) If z P Z˚, then T¯ pzq is not empty and the maximizer can be either in τ˚i or in T
˚
i pzq.
(ii) If z P Z zZ˚, then z can only be 0. T¯ p0q “ H and Tip0q can only be in τ
˚
i .
Proof of Proposition 3. Take an observation i and define Ai “ tz P Z
˚ | Tipzq “ T
˚
i pzqu.
(i) By definition, Ai Ă Z
˚; therefore Ai “ Z (which defines the subpopulation P1) requires
Z “ Z˚.
(ii) Now suppose that Ai ‰ Z. If z P Z
˚zAi, then by construction Tipzq ‰ T
˚
i pzq. By
Proposition 2(i), Tipzq can only be τ
˚
i . If z R Z
˚, then z “ 0 and we know from
Proposition 2(ii) that Tip0q “ τ
˚
i .
(iii) Assume that τ˚i “ τ P T
˚. Then Z¯pτq ‰ H. For any z in Z¯pτq,
V ˚i pzq ě ∆¯τ ` uiτ ą ∆τ ` uiτ “ ∆
˚
i ;
therefore z P Ai. This proves that Z¯pτq Ă Ai.
Proof of Corollary 1. It follows directly from Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. First assume that Z˚ ‰ Z, so that only the classes in P2 exist. The
set A of Corollary 1 must be a subset of Z˚. For each such subset, τ can take any value in
T z T ˚; and if τ P T ˚ then τ must be in A. Each subset A of Z˚ with a elements therefore
allows for pa` |T |´ |T ˚|q values of τ . This gives a total of
|Z˚|ÿ
a“0
ˆ
|Z˚|
a
˙
pa` |T |´ |T ˚|q
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response-types in subpopulation P2. Moreover, we know that |T
˚| “ |Z˚| under one-to-one
targeting. Using the identities
bÿ
a“0
ˆ
b
a
˙
“ p1` 1qb “ 2b
bÿ
a“0
a
ˆ
b
a
˙
“ bˆ
b´1ÿ
a“0
ˆ
b´ 1
a
˙
“ bˆ 2b´1,
we obtain a total of p2|T |´ |Z˚|q ˆ 2|Z
˚|´1 types.
If Z “ Z˚, we must add the one type in P1. On the other hand, we must subtract the
|T | classes cpZ˚, τq that are ruled out by Corollary 1(iii).
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) First assume that Z˚ ‰ Z, so that the subpopulation P1 does
not exist. There are two ways to obtain Tipzq “ t.
• The first one is for i to belong to in any cpA, tq element, with A Ă Z˚ and t
constrained to be in A`. This requires that z R A. If z is in Z˚, this implies
A Ă Z˚ztzu. If not, then A can be any subset of Z˚. This gives the first term
in (2.1), and (2.2).
• The second way to get Tipzq “ t is if t “ z, which can only happen if z P Z
˚.
Then if i P cpA, τq for any A that contains z and any τ P A`, we have Tipzq “ z.
This gives the second term in (2.1).
(ii) If Z˚ “ Z, we only need to add in the subpopulation P1 if z “ t, and to delete from
the summations the case A “ Z˚ “ Z. Introducing these changes in (2.1) gives (2.3).
Since Z˚ “ Z there is obviously no subcase z R Z˚.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since Z˚ “ t1u ‰ Z in Example 8, we apply equations (2.1) and (2.2).
With Z˚ “ t1u, we can only have A “ H, with A` “ T zt1u, or A “ t1u, with A` “ T .
Equation (2.1) gives
P pt|1q “ 1pt ‰ 1qPrpcpH, tqq ` 1pt “ 1q
ÿ
τPT
Prpcpt1u, τqq;
and equation (2.2) gives
P pt|0q “ 1pt ‰ 1qPrpcpH, tqq ` Prpcpt1u, 1qq.
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We already know that cpH, tq is At and cpt1u, τq is A1 if τ “ 1 and the complier group Cτ1
otherwise. Therefore for t “ 1
P p1|1q “ PrpA1q `
ÿ
τ‰1
PrpCτ1q
and P p1|0q “ PrpA1q; while for t ‰ 1 we have P pt|1q “ PrpAtq and P pt|0q “ PrpCt1q`PrpAtq.
Proof of Proposition 8. It is straightforward from Figure 6.
Proof of Proposition 7. It is straightforward from Figure 5.
Proof of Lemma 2. We start from the sum over all response groups:
E¯zptq “
ÿ
C
Ezpt|CqPrpi P Cq.
First note that if group C does not have treatment t under instrument z, it should not figure
in the sum. Now if Cpzq “ t, we have
Ezpt|Cq “ EpYi1pTi “ tq|Zi “ z, i P Cq
“ EpYiptq|Zi “ z, i P Cq
“ EpYiptq|i P Cq.
The second part of the Lemma is just adding up.
Proof of Proposition 9. By Lemma 2, we get
E¯0p1q “ E rYip1q|i P A1sPrpi P A1q
E¯0ptq “ E rYiptq|i P AtsPrpi P Atq
` E rYiptq|i P Ct1sPrpi P Ct1q for t ‰ 1,
E¯1p1q “ E rYip1q|i P A1sPrpi P A1q
`
ÿ
t‰1
E rYip1q|i P Ct1sPrpi P Ct1q,
E¯1ptq “ E rYiptq|i P AtsPrpi P Atq for t ‰ 1.
Since Proposition 6 identifies all type probabilities, the first and fourth equations give directly
EpYiptq|i P Atq for all t. Then the second equation identifies EpYiptq|i P Ct1q for t ‰ 1.
49
However, the values EpYip1q|i P Ct1q for t ‰ 1 are only linked by
E¯1p1q ´ E¯0p1q “
ÿ
t‰1
E rYip1q|i P Ct1sPrpi P Ct1q.
By subtraction, we obtain
pE¯1p1q ´ E¯0p1qq ´
ÿ
t‰1
pE¯0ptq ´ E¯1ptqq
“
ÿ
t‰1
E rYip1q ´ Yiptq|i P Ct1sPrpi P Ct1q.
Combining these results with Proposition 6 and Lemma 2 yields the formula in the Propo-
sition. The denominator
ÿ
t‰1
pP pt|0q ´ P pt|1qq “ P p1|1q ´ P p1|0q
is positive, since all terms in the sum are positive. It follows that all αt weights are positive
and sum to 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. The corollary follows directly from the proof of Proposition 9, as
ÿ
t‰1
Prpi P Ct1q “
ÿ
t‰1
pP pt|0q ´ P pt|1qq “ P p1|1q ´ P p1|0q
gives EpYip1q|i P Ct1q “ pE¯1p1q ´ E¯0p1qq{pP p1|1q ´ P p1|0qq.
Proof of Proposition 10. For z “ 0, 1, 2,
E rYi|Zi “ zs
“
2ÿ
t“0
E rYi|Zi “ z, i P AtsPrpi P Atq ` E rYi|Zi “ z, i P C112sPrpi P C112q
` E rYi|Zi “ z, i P C212sPrpi P C212q ` E rYi|Zi “ z, i P C010sPrpi P C010q
` E rYi|Zi “ z, i P C002sPrpi P C002q ` E rYi|Zi “ z, i P C012sPrpi P C012q.
Note that the first term is also
2ÿ
t“0
E rYiptq|i P AtsPrpi P Atq,
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which does not depend on z. It follows that
E rYi|Zi “ 0s ´ E rYi|Zi “ 1s
“ E rYip2q ´ Yip1q|i P C212sPrpi P C212q ` E rYip0q ´ Yip1q|i P C01˚sPrpi P C01˚q,
E rYi|Zi “ 0s ´ E rYi|Zi “ 2s
“ E rYip1q ´ Yip2q|i P C112sPrpi P C112q ` E rYip0q ´ Yip2q|i P C0˚2sPrpi P C0˚2q.
Combining these formulæ with Proposition 7 yields the result.
B Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 11. (i) It follows directly from Proposition 6 and from the mapping
of types.
(ii) From Proposition 9, we have
EpY Di p1q|i P A
D
1
q “ EpY Ti p1q|i P A
T
1
q “
E¯T
0
p1q
P T p1|0q
“
E¯D
0
p1q
PDp1|0q
.
Moreover,
EpY Di p0q|i P A
D
0
q “ EpY Di p0q|i P
Ť
t‰1
ATt q
“
ÿ
t‰1
EpY Ti ptq|i P A
T
t q
P T pt|1q
1´ P T p1|1q
“
ÿ
t‰1
E¯T
1
ptq
1´ P T p1|1q
“
E¯D
1
p0q
1´ PDp1|1q
.
(iii) Now consider the weighted LATE
ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpY
T
i p1q ´ Y
T
i ptq|i P C
T
t1q, which is identified
in the unfiltered treatment model (equation 2.11). The weights αTt “ pP
T pt|0q ´
P T pt|1qq{pP T p1|1q ´ P T p1|0qq are not identified any more. Note however that for any
variable Wi, ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpWi|i P Ct1q “ EpWi|i P C
D
01
q;
therefore
ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpY
D
i p1q|i P C
T
t1q “ EpY
D
i p1q|i P C
D
01
q. The LHS of Equation (2.11)
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becomes
EpY Di p1q|i P C
D
01
q ´
ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpY
T
i ptq|i P Ct1q.
On the RHS we had
pE¯T
1
p1q ´ E¯T
0
p1qq ´
ř
t‰1pE¯
T
0
ptq ´ E¯T
1
ptqq
P T p1|1q ´ P T p1|0q
.
The denominator is still identified as PDp1|1q ´ PDp1|0q, as is the first term of the
numerator, which equals E¯D
1
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p1q. From equation 3.3,
ÿ
t‰1
pE¯T
0
ptq ´ E¯T
1
ptqq “ E¯D
1
p0q.
Therefore we identify
EpY Di p1q|i P C
D
01
q ´
ÿ
t‰1
αTt EpY
T
i ptq|i P C
T
t1q “
pE¯D
1
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p1qq ´ pE¯D
0
p0q ´ E¯D
1
p0qq
PDp1|1q ´ PDp1|0q
,
which is the standard Wald estimator.
Proof of Corollary 3. It is obvious by direct substitution into Equation (3.4).
Proof of Proposition 12. (i) It follows directly from the mapping of groups.
(ii) Part (i) identifies the weight αT
0
“ pPDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1qq{pPDp1|1q ´ PDp1|0qq, which
we denote αD
0
in the Proposition. The other terms obtain by simple factorization, with
1´ α0D “ Prpi P C
T
t1|t ą 1q.
Proof of Proposition 13. Recall that Table 2 shows which groups take Di “ d when Zi “ z.
(i) We have PDp0|zq “ P T p0|zq for z “ 0, 1. Given Proposition 7(i), this gives us
PrpCT
010
q`PrpCT
012
q “ PDp0|0q´PDp0|1q and PrpCT
002
q`PrpCT
012
q “ PDp0|0q´PDp0|2q,
which map into
PrpCD
010
q ` PrpCD
011
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
PrpCD
001
q ` PrpCD
011
q “ PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2q;
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and the last equation in Proposition 7(i) maps into
PrpCD
001
q ` PrpCD
010
q ` PrpCD
011
q ` PrpAD
0
q “ PDp0|0q.
Finally, PrpAD
1
q “ PDp1|0q from the table. Defining p “ PrpCD
011
q gives the equations in
the proposition, along with the constraints on p. Note also that PrpCD
0˚0q “ PrpA
D
0
q `
PrpCD
010
q “ PDp0|2q.
(ii) First note that E¯D
0
p1q “ EpYi1pi P A
D
1
qq “ EpY Di p1q|i P A
D
1
qPrpAD
1
q. The other
equations can be read from the table:
E¯D
1
p0q “ EpY Dp0q1pCD
00˚qq
E¯D
2
p0q “ EpY Dp0q1pCD
0˚0qq
E¯D
0
p0q “ EpY Dp0q1pCD
0˚˚qq
E¯D
1
p1q “ EpY Dp1q1pCD˚1˚qq
E¯D
2
p1q “ EpY Dp1q1pCD˚˚1qq.
Part (i) showed that we point-identify PrpAD
1
q, PrpCD
01˚q, PrpC
D
0˚1q, and PrpC
D
00˚q. This
allows us to rewrite the last three lines as
E¯D
0
p0q “ PDp0|1qEpY Dp0q|CD
00˚q ` pP
Dp0|0q ´ PDp0|1qqEpY Dp0q|CD
01˚q
“ PDp0|2qEpY Dp0q|CD
0˚0q ` pP
Dp0|0q ´ PDp0|2qqEpY Dp0q|CD
0˚1q
E¯D
1
p1q “ pPDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1qqEpY Dp1q|CD
01˚q ` P
Dp1|0qEpY Dp1q|AD
1
q
E¯D
2
p1q “ pPDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2qqEpY Dp1q|CD
0˚1q ` P
Dp1|0qEpY Dp1q|AD
1
q,
where we used the fact that CD
1˚1 “ C
D
11˚ “ A
D
1
.
Simple calculations give
EpY Dp0q|CD
00˚q “
E¯D
1
p0q
PrpCD
00˚q
“
E¯D
1
p0q
PDp0|1q
EpY Dp0q|CD
0˚0q “
E¯D
2
p0q
PrpCD
0˚0q
“
E¯D
2
p0q
PDp0|2q
EpY Dp1q|CD
01˚q “
E¯D
1
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p1q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
EpY Dp1q|CD
0˚1q “
E¯D
2
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p1q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2q
.
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Finally,
EpY Dp0q|CD
01˚q “
E¯D
1
p1q ´ EpY Dp0q1pCD
00˚qq
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
“
E¯D
1
p1q ´ E¯D
1
p0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
EpY Dp0q|CD
0˚1q “
E¯D
2
p1q ´ EpY Dp0q1pCD
00˚qq
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
“
E¯D
0
p0q ´ E¯D
1
p0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
(iii) From (ii) we obtain directly, using Lemma 2,
EpY Dp1q ´ Y Dp0q|CD
01˚q “
E¯D
1
p1q ` E¯D
1
p0q ´ E¯D
0
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
“
EpY |Z “ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|1q
EpY Dp1q ´ Y Dp0q|CD
0˚1q “
E¯D
2
p1q ` E¯D
2
p0q ´ E¯D
0
p1q ´ E¯D
0
p0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2q
“
EpY |Z “ 2q ´ EpY |Z “ 0q
PDp0|0q ´ PDp0|2q
.
Proof of Proposition 14. Recall that Table 5 shows how response groups map instrument
values into filtered treatment values. The proof follows directly.
Proof of Proposition 15. The proof is omitted since it is similar to those of Propositions 13
and 14.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using the fact that Prpi P CD
0001
|Xi “ xq “ DiDDpxq, we have that
θ0 “
ż
ErYip1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
0001
, Xi “ xsfpx|i P C
D
0001
qdx
“
ż
ErYip1q ´ Yip0q|i P C
D
0001
, Xi “ xs
Prpi P CD
0001
|Xi “ xqfpxq
Prpi P CD
0001
q
dx
“
ż
DiDY pxq
DiDDpxq
Prpi P CD
0001
|Xi “ xqfpxq
Prpi P CD
0001
q
dx
“
ş
DiDY pxqfpxqdx
Prpi P CD
0001
q
“
ş
DiDY pxqfpxqdxş
DiDDpxqfpxqdx
,
which proves the lemma.
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C Additional Material
C.1 Strict Targeting in the Ternary/ternary Model
Just like ours, Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016)’s approach to identification relies on
a monotonicity assumption and a restriction on the mapping from instruments to treatments.
We translate them here in our notation to show that in this model, their assumptions are
equivalent to ours.
Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016) impose the following in their Assumption 4:
• if Tip0q “ 1 then Tip1q “ 1
• if Tip0q “ 2 then Tip2q “ 2.
This can be viewed as a monotonicity assumption. It excludes the twelve response groups
C10˚, C12˚, C2˚0, and C2˚1.
Their Proposition 2 proves point-identification of response-groups when one of three alter-
native assumptions is added to their Assumption 4. We focus here on their assumption (iii),
which is the weakest of the three and the one their application relies on. In our notation, it
states that:
• if (Tip0q ‰ 1 and Tip1q ‰ 1), then (Tip0q “ 2 iff Tip1q “ 2)
• if (Tip0q ‰ 2 and Tip2q ‰ 2), then (Tip0q “ 1 iff Tip2q “ 1).
These complicated statements can be simplified. Take the first part. If both Tip0q and Tip1q
are not 1, then they can only be 0 or 2. Therefore we are requiring Tip0q “ Tip1q. Applying
the same argument to the second part, Assumption (iii) becomes:
• if (Tip0q ‰ 1 and Tip1q ‰ 1), then Tip0q “ Tip1q
• if (Tip0q ‰ 2 and Tip2q ‰ 2), then Tip0q “ Tip2q.
It therefore excludes the response-groups C02˚, C20˚, C0˚1, and C1˚0. The response-group
C021 appears twice in this list; and four other response-groups were already ruled out by
Assumption 4. The reader can easily check that the 33 ´ 12´ p11´ 4q “ 8 response-groups
left are exactly the same as in our Figure 5.
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C.2 A Variant of Filtered Factorial Design
Let us return to the factorial design of Example 4, with a twist: the unfiltered treatment
consists of the full ranking of the three alternatives. The instrument values are still p0 ˆ
0, 0ˆ 1, 1ˆ 0, 1ˆ 1q; now Ti is a pair that consists of the most-preferred alternative
T ipzq “ arg max
t“0,1,2
pUzptq ` uitq
and of the least-preferred alternative
T ipzq “ arg min
t“0,1,2
pUzptq ` uitq.
In Section 3.2, we considered the case when Ti is only T i; and we added a filter Di “ 1pT i ą
0q. Let us now take Ti “ pT i, T iq, with the filter Di “ 1pT i “ 0q.
The model of Section 3.2, where we only observed whether the most-preferred alternative
was 0, led to a double hurdle model. In this variant, we only observe whether the least-
preferred alternative is 0, which leads to a different filtered treatment model:
(C.1) Dipzq “ 1pui0 ă minp∆
T
z p1q ` ui1,∆
T
z p2q ` ui2qq.
We keep the same constraints on the mean utilities as in (3.8). Under Equation (C.1), we
have five response groups, as shown in Figure 10. Table 5 shows how response groups map
instrument values into filtered treatment values.
Table 5: D-response Groups for the Alternative Factorial Design Model
Dipzq “ 0 Dipzq “ 1
z “ 0ˆ 0 AD
0
Ť
CD
0011
Ť
CD
0101
Ť
CD
0111
AD
1
z “ 1ˆ 0 AD
0
Ť
CD
0011
AD
1
Ť
CD
0101
Ť
CD
0111
z “ 0ˆ 1 AD
0
Ť
CD
0101
AD
1
Ť
CD
0011
Ť
CD
0111
z “ 1ˆ 1 AD
0
AD
1
Ť
CD
0011
Ť
CD
0101
Ť
CD
0111
Proposition 15 (Identifying the Model with Equation (C.1)). (i) The probabilities of the
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Figure 10: Response Groups under Equation (C.1)
ui1 ´ ui0
ui2 ´ ui0
CD
0001
AD
0
CD
0011
CD
0101
AD
1
P0ˆ0
P1ˆ0
P0ˆ1P1ˆ1
D-response groups are point-identified by
PrpAD
0
q “ PDp1|0ˆ 0q
PrpAD
1
q “ PDp0|1ˆ 1q
PrpCD
0011
q “ PDp0|0ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|0ˆ 1q
PrpCD
0101
q “ PDp0|0ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|1ˆ 0q
PrpCD
0111
q “ PDp0|1ˆ 0q ` PDp0|1ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|0ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|1ˆ 1q,
and the model has three testable implications:
PDp0|0ˆ 0q ě PDp0|0ˆ 1q,
PDp0|0ˆ 0q ě PDp0|1ˆ 0q,
PDp0|1ˆ 0q ` PDp0|0ˆ 1q ě PDp0|0ˆ 0q ´ PDp0|1ˆ 1q.
(ii) The LATEs on the three groups of compliers are point-identified by
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0101
q “
EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 0q
PDp1|0ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|0ˆ 0q
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0011
q “
EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 0q ´ EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 0q
PDp1|1ˆ 0q ´ PDp1|0ˆ 0q
EpY Di p1q ´ Y
D
i p0q|i P C
D
0001
q “
EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 0q ` EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 1q ´ EpY |Z “ 1ˆ 0q ´ EpY |Z “ 0ˆ 1q
PDp1|0ˆ 0q ` PDp1|1ˆ 1q ´ PDp1|1ˆ 0q ´ PDp1|0ˆ 1q
.
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It is worth comparing Proposition 14 with Proposition 15. One interesting observation
is that the share of CD
0111
in Proposition 14 is identical up to sign to that of CD
0001
in Propo-
sition 15. Namely, PrpCD
0111
q “ DiDpT q and PrpCD
0001
q “ 0 in Proposition 14; PrpCD
0111
q “ 0
and PrpCD
0001
q “ ´DiDpT q in Proposition 15, where DiDpT q is the difference-in-differences
of the propensity score defined by:
DiDpT q “ tPrrDi “ 1|Zi “ 1ˆ 0s ´ PrrDi “ 1|Zi “ 0ˆ 0su
´ tPrrDi “ 1|Zi “ 1ˆ 1s ´ PrrDi “ 1|Zi “ 0ˆ 1su .
In terms of economic interpretation, one may think of the selection mechanism in Proposi-
tion 14 as the scenario when instruments 1pZi “ 1 ˆ 0q and 1pZi “ 0 ˆ 1q are substitutes
to encourage agents to take treatment. On the contrary, the selection mechanism in Propo-
sition 15 corresponds to the case that instruments 1pZi “ 1 ˆ 0q and 1pZi “ 0 ˆ 1q are
complements. The same estimands identify the average treatment effects for conceptually
distinct subpopulations, depending on the details of the selection mechanism. This suggests
that it is important to learn about the nature of selection into treatment before interpreting
the causal parameters of different compliers. To do this, one can estimate the difference-
in-differences of the propensity score DiDpT q and use its sign to determine whether equa-
tion (3.9) or equation (C.1) is more plausible in any particular application.
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